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I. IMTRODUCfflDH
The hypothesis of this paper is that U.S. national
interes-s affect arms transfer derision making in sslectsi
Latin America, specifically Brazil. As wi-h any hypothesis,
before the author's thcaghts are prssen-^ed, a reader miah-^
invoke cer-^ain assumptions. FoLlDwing is a nummary of
possible assunptions or varia-^ions on the hyoothesis, and a
discussion of those dimensions so that the reaier will l^.now
what considerations went into the author's approach to the
issue.
The hypothesis may best be analyzed by breaking down -the
statement, Ths essential elements ar=: (1) Th= iJ.S. national
interes-s; (2) arms transfer decis i:) n-making; (3) La-^in
America (Brazil) , A description Df methodology applied in
proving the hypothesis will follov^ the duscussion of -^.hose
components. Limitations of the thesis, although not specifi-
cally stated, will be implied in -aat latter 3^c-^,ion of the
introduction.
A. THE NATIONAL INTERESTS
Most simply, the gualif ication "U.S." will eliminate any
in-depth treatment of th= national interests of any other
country in aris transfer dealings *ith Latin America. The
other actors who have national interests in Latin American
arms transfer include the following suppliers: ?rance. West
Germany, Italy, *:he United Kingdom, Israel, and the Soviet
Union.

The natiDnal interests of *h9 racioien": will no*- b9
enumerated as such. Rather they wLLl appear ir. -.hose c^.ses
where they cDincide or are opposed to those of the United
S-ates.
The term "national interests" is a debatable one. i A
definition applicable to this subject will be aiven after
acknowledging the many ways in which the term can be in-er-
pre-^ed. Thcsr interpretations will consider the extremes
-^f
moralism and realism, and the influence of public opinion
and political elites on that which is baptized "the national
interests." Ultimately, ao absolute national interests can
be named that will perpetually affect arms transfers. There
are two reasons for this position: (1) interests by them-
selves are a fluid, "mooiy" concept. (2) when modified by
the word "national," it invites tha perceptions of th=
entire population of the country at worst, =nd "rhose of
pluralities of individual actors, bureaucratic crganiza-
tions, and the public, at best.
A further complication arises when the distinction
between being in the national intarast and being a national
interest is made. Making such a distinction is the luxury of
the one observing the decision makar and the publicity
around or implementation of -^he dacision. Th-- subject of
arms transfers involves many combinations of interests and
policies enacted to encourage or to restrain them. Arms
transfers ha^e been used as a davice to further still
another policy in the national interest, tha-^ of human
rights. when two pclicias are so linked, events may prove
that one overrides the other. It ioas not necessarily mean
unequivocally that one is a greatar na": ional interest or
* Participant s in the "debate" cover the subject from a
wide ranae of standooints: some insist the na'-icnal inter-
ests underlie all action (Morgenthaui ; others feel tha-^ the
world is too large, and political inauiry is becomino too
svstematic to rely on the concept (5osanau) .

that thay shoild not hav= been so conj^in'rd. ht
-^.h? tiins of
the making of a decision, be it ths pronoancetnen- cf =
policy or of i program, the action to be exercised under its
auspices will be considered to be In the national interest.
Results due to the "marketing" of the policy may prove
otherwise, e.g., the way President Carter failed -o "sell"
human rights. Lessons learned may or may not serve to alier
subsequent determinants of the national interest.
Such considerations provide insight to an otherwise
simple substantive statement. The^ help make *:he transition
between the complexities of defining -he na^ion^l ir.-erests
concerning a policy in a geographical area and the proceed-
ings about a decision based on thoss interests.
B. ARMS TRANSFER DECISION MAKING
This section discusses the difficulties in measuring
arms transfers, offering a solution through treating tht
question of the decision whether to transfer or deny arms,
rather than the measure of the level of arms itself.
1 . Dif _fioulties in lissurin^ Ef f ects of Interests on
T ra n sf e r s
Consider using th= level of arms -transfer from the
U.S. to a recipient Latin American country as a measure.
For example, it is in the U.S. national interest to have
sold the F-16 to Venezuela for sevsral reasons: (1) i-^ is
our ally in the Rio Pact; (2) the tension in the Caribbean
recommends it both for the defense of democracy and for the
protection of military and sea lanss; (3) it is rich in
strategic resources. The act of transfer would be proven or
disproven to have occurred as a rasult of it being in the
national interest. This proved to be an in feasible method
for these general reasons: conflioting national interests
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and irabili-y to draw a cause and rffect r9lat: onsh- o =van
between quantifiable variables.
a. CDnflizting National I.itsr^srs
It would be foolish to hypothesize "-.hat the
decision to sell or deny arms is i^ne without consideration
of the national interests. The prDblem is thai arms trans-
fers may be in the national intersst for rrasons such a-
those enumerated for Venezuela, bat against -^he national
interest of human rights, if it ware found -o be the cas^
that they *ere violated or falsely reported there.
Furthermore, it might be found, for example, tha* the l^^vel
of arms transfers in Venezuela woil3 prove higher than that
for Brazil. This might lead to the conclusion that it is
less in cur national intsrest to transfer ams to Brazil
than it is to Venezuela. Jumping to this conclusion
completely ignores any othar variables such as a decision on
the part cf tae recipient to transfer arms with o-her coun-
tries besides the U.S. Another coisiiera* ion is tha*", c*" her
circumstances in the recipien*, not related to arms trans-
fers, may be just as much in the national interest. The
prime example is how the economic situation in Brazil could
endanger its political stability.
b. Lack of Causal Relationship
Looking to other "measucables" , it was thought
that data froi World Mil it a ry lx£iiilkl!i^ii 21 hl^l Transfers
might show nore concrete relationships. Therefore, a
multiple regression of such independent variables as mili-
tary expenditures', gross national product, central
government expenditures, population, armed forces, and total
imports was done on the dependent variable of arms trans-
fers. Although some positive correlations were found, none
were significant, and the data is not included because of
11

i-s lack of rslevance. Thsse findings wer9 not anlik* these
of professionals, among whom are Geoffrey Kemp, who founi
that empirical studies offer conflicting conclusions and
seldom establish causal relationships ' Ref . 1: p. 4 1]. 2ven
a semi-static factor of arms on hand is difficult to quan-
tify. And s.rns transfers, being an active, two-way process,
are all the harder to pin down, even if a sole supplier and
sole recipient are named. Specific difficulties encounterai
include these questions: When are arms considered offi-
cially transferred? How does one oount atms, some of whose
parts are from elsewhere, that are assembled in country?
What happens *rhen the national interests dictate that arms
be restrained? [Ref. 2: pp. 89-90]
Such frustrations with the countable caution a
researcher that to try to measure a quality such as -^.he
national in-erests is plainly impossible. 2
Finally, the question of the effects of arms
transfers is oomplicated by ideological predispositions and
value preferences of policy makers and ^.cadeiicians alike
[Ref. 1: p. 38].
On the issue of declining arms transfers to
Latin America, the differing philosophies of three recen-^.
presidents exemplify this. In brief, the Nixon Doctrine
sought to diminish military presence and have American arms
represent us abroad. Carter felt tnat arms shouM not be a
"reward" for repressive regimes. Reagan feels that insta-
bility might be remedied by arms sales. To underline the
variety of predispositions, within Reagan's very administra-
tion, there are officials who are wary of arns accumulated
by potential adversaries cour-^esy of the U.S. [Ref- 3: p.
53].
2Nevertheless, there have been attempts to determine
correlations between human rights violations and military




Because all these probleas tend tD cor.fise the
issue, a "combination" methodology, which will be describe!
later, was created in order to prove the hypothesis.
2« The Decision Making Aspect of Arras Transfers
The originally stated hypothesis, that r.^.tional
interests affect arms transfers decision making, is perhaps
better phrased by rewording it as follows: the abstract
concept of national interests is connected to the nearly
measurable one of arms transfers by the procedure of deci-
sion making. The terii "decision making" itself embodies
the thought and deliberation akin to the abstraction, as
well as thp act of deciding. If a decision is carried out,
i"^ will provide a semblance of taagible results. Stating
that part of the hypothesis in suci a way allow=5 the flexi-
bility to treat how interests affect arms transfers wi^hou-^
restricting the discussion to a iirect cause and effect
relationship.
a. The Terms "Policy" and "Prograra"
Aiother point to be kept in mind is the use of
terms regarding the results of decision making. Although
they are assumed in Congress and elsewhere in simple
dictionary defined meanings, woris such as "policy" and
"program" are victimized by the same phenomenon as the
phrase "national interests." No one is certain of the
nuances of a person's or group's interpretation of the
concept. Also, it has frequently been said ^.ha^ we have no
Latin Americai policy. What qualities might be missing from
existing treatments of Latin American problems, by whatever
name? Is a policy or program supposed to be universally
applicable to the region? What is the time linit for appli-
cability? How strictly is it supposed to apply?
13

b. Th9 Tsrm "Latin America"
A similar lack of cDnsansus on •^erminoloci v
exists for the name of th? ar^a itself. what is "Latin"
America? why is that nineteenth osntury French term still
used? How much uniformity is assuaai by using one term for
every bit of land in the Western Hrnisphere
-^^hose ances-ors"
languages had roots in Latin?
Ii this case, the name is merely a label, and
the topic area is easily understood by coniext. As long as
those concerr=d are awar? that the t^rm "Latin America" is
still used broadly to include all those countries mentioned
above, ther= should be little confusion or insult. What can
be imminently dangerous ars preconceptions of Latin America
and its very different countries as baing analogous to the
commonality of the United S-^ates of America. The use of
foreign languages rooted in Latin ioas not allow for the
size and resoarces of rach nation, the dynamics of ethnic
mixes, the exguisite diversities of culture.
C. LATIN AMERICA/ BRAZIL
The third component of the hypothrsis is stated as above
because is ussd with this rationals: some U.S. na-^ional
interests apply to the whole of Latin America, yet to force
a strict focused comparison of all threats and conditions of
Latin American countries pertinent to arms transfers would
be laborious and often repetitive. Some threats are not that
interesting or serious; some conditions are no^ so distinc-
tive. The effort would be greater than the actual
significance of arms transfers in a global contsxt. To prop-
erly place the subject in -^ ha international arena, the
variables are dealt with by citing:
(1) in selected cases thosa U.S. intarasts in Latin American
countries which stand out from the othars;
14

(2) particular threats, ?.g., border conflicts tha- <=:xist
only in c<=rtain Latin Atn^rican countries, becaas^ thsy natu-
rally motivats t hs need for arms;
(3) general political and ^cononic conditions as they
engender U.S. national security interests.
The reason Brazil was chosen as the case country ccvar
economic, political, and military rationales. That is, in
spite of debt and global recession, Brazil is one of -^he
strongest economies in Latin America; i- is presently
exempting its5lf once again from the extremes of military
dictatorship and moving toward i more :natur=, "guided"
democracy that promises to endure; finally, it is one of the
few Latin American countries having its own aras industry,
thus sharing anc^her kind of commonality with the supplier
country whose interests will be exaained for effec-^ in arms
transfer decision making.
The interdependence to be made avident in the chapters
on conditions in the recipient and suppli-er countries will
serve to prove that national inter=3ts do indeed affect U.S.
arms transfers decision making.
D. METHODOLOSY
As has been mentioned, the methodology to be used is a
modified focused comparison. That is, although similar
issues will be dealt with regarding both U.S. and Latin
American national interests, not as Buch attention will be
given to the history of the national interests of Latin
America. Also, the problem of conflicting na-ional interests
will be restricted to the major ones in the U.S. To intro-
duce a list cf conflicting interests in the recipient would
complicate the thesis unnecessarily. Thus, -^he generalized
Latin American national interest of self -de- ermina-^ ion will
prevail. The general U.S. interests in Latin America will be
15

cit^d in the description of chap-sr .hr&s. That chaD*9r
also provi3s3 an idea cf other Latin American na-ional
interests, as voiced in ^hs Declaration of Ayacacho, a la-9
1970' s declaration by eight Latin Aaericar. countries often
cited in discissions of possible regional arms restrain*.
Whenever possible, graphic prasrntation will be offered
to clarify concepts or support stataaients.
Chapter two provides background on the term
"national interests," its use, its importance, and philo-
sophical variations on the concept itself. Basically it
deals with the non-definable, indeterminable process of
acting in th= national interest, concluding that all the
dynamics cf the process must be considered before labelling
a policy as "in the national interest" and expecting predic-
table, favorable results.
2» Pol icymaker Thinking on Ii*S. /Latin American
at-a s r c;
Chapter three names the national ir-^erests as
declared historically and recently in Latin American and
arms transf«=r policy statemen"^s. Specific national interests
that will be touched upon directly or indirectly in that
chapter include: political stability, economic stability,
the balance cf power, anti-coamunisa, inti-terrorism , ccun-
"^erinsur gency, free trade, numan rights, nuclear
non-proliferation, democratizatiDn, Caribbean sea lanes,
natural and strategic resources.
3. Conditions in ^he R^cioifnt
Chanter four describes ^.h.B conditions in cer-^ain
recipient Latin American countries wherein U.S. arms
transfer or denial would be advisable in light of these
16

conditions. No specific r sconirneniat ions ar^ aiad^ in thsit
respect; th^ chapter merely attempts zo answer the following
'rooncraic and ool it ico-n^ilit arv questions which migh* help in
tn£)<[ing the deoision:
What economio interests in La-^.in America/Brazil are of
concern to the U.S.? How did tha current situa-icn come
about? what car. be done to renedy the Latin American
economic situation to benefit both par-ies and possibly the
world economy? Can economic benefits result from arms
trade? Does the case country of Brazil exrmplify these
benefits?
What is the political situation ii Latin America? Hew do
political circumstances influence arms sales? Hew do Latin
American arms purchases compare with the rest of the world?
What are the implication- of Latin American arms purchase
patterns in terms of possible regional restraint? What
political factors in Brazil have a bearing on their arms
industry an its future?
What is the magnitude of armed foross in Latin America? To
what extent are arms purchased indigenously thsre? Hew great
is the capacity to absorb sophisticated arms obtained
outside of Latin America? What ace incentives for arms
purchase?
4, U.S. Rationa les as Su£Dlier
Chapter five uses general rationales for the United
States to supply arms and elaborate on those pertinent to
conditions in Latin America, particularly in Brazil. The
rationales will be divided into *he political, mili'tary, and
economic benefits and cost rationales offered by Geoffrey
Kemp and Steven Miller in their wor^c "The Arms Transfer
Phenomenon." [Sef. 4: p. 24] These in turn will cov
17

topics of infiaence and Isverag®, support for allies and
need to proteo- base and in talligsn^i-collectin:! riahis, and
will r=p<=at sofne of the economic issass addressed in chapter
four. The discussion of costs will deal with reverse
leverage, the promotion of arms races, and identification
with repressive regimes.
A coinoarison trends in Foreign Military Sales,
the Military Assistance Program, md Coitnercial sales from
the Uni-ed Stites is made over the period 1966 through 1982,
to attempt to see the effect U.S. policy, par-^icularly
under the Carter Administration, tiii on those arms related
matters in Brazil.
5 . hLIl iH 3ra zil
Chapter six provides a sumnary of -h= current status
of -he arms industry in Brazil after a short review of U.S.
relations that contributed to its rise.
18

II. THE PRO BLEW OF THE N^riONAL INTERESTS
The national interest is iniesi i concep-:, and, as such,
it is boundless. At its lost definable it is an "absTac*
generic idsa g9naraii2=i from particular instances." Th?
has- "definitions" of it are thosa which allow for "partic-
ular instances." 'Jnf ortunat ely , thas? are highly criticable,
much like those aberrations which Bans Llorg9rithau lara'=nted
try to touch everything "and com= to grips with nothing."
[Ref. 10: p. 833 1 Thus, they cease to be trua irfinitions.
The only recourse for on= who wishes to find meaning in
the concept is to familiarize hinsslf wi-h all i-^s dimen-
sions. Also, it is worthwhile to work wi-^-h exist-ing or
proposal defini-ions. Two attempts will be discussed here,
and the facets of mora lengthy -r raiments of the concapt
will be developed. Thas? might b= groupad in^o two major
categories of philosophical and practical guastions.
Philosophical questions include:
— Is the concapt idealistically or Tia •:.= rialistically based?
— Are "he national interests subjective or objective?
— Do moral considara tions in dererniaina national interests
adversely affact policy?
An intermedia t a , half philosophical, half practical
qua st ion is: What do r a suits of actions based on the
national interasts have to do witi the national in"^erasts
thamselves? ^
3Richard L. Millett, a history oroiessc:: from tha
U" - V'^rs''
-y of Illinois present at tha House h?arina on Arms
'^'"a^s'^e- p-^licy in Latin Amarica, whan asked whethar
Reagan''s more" liberal transfer oolicy would advance inter-
ests in Latin America, said that' it was questionable to wha^.
extent any official policy on arms transfers could actually




— What is the terra used for; why doss the term =5xist?
— What does it mean to defend something in terms of the
national interests; i.e., what is b=ing defended?
Those questions are expanded upon by providing some
background through a sampling of certain authors' treatmen*:s
of both kinds of questions. Some one-sentence attempts at
definitions will be examined, and as will ideas of what it
is that we wish to defend in terms of various interpreta-
tions of the national interest.
A. BACKGROUND
It is interesting to note that in less modern times,
national interests were referred to as "national honor,"
"public interest," and "general will." Those oriainal terms
for the emerging concept were ironically close to what is
expressed in the simplified idea ttiat "the national interest
is what the nation, i.e., the decision- maker, decides it
is." [Rsf. 5: p. 36] Such names for "-.he concept as "the
will of the prince" and "dynastic intrrests" [Ref. 6: p. 3U
]
seemed to reflect greater accuracy as to whose interests
were considered in decision making. R-gardless of suppor*:
of the people and belief in royal powers, policy was subjec-
•^ive, and so terms for tha "national" interests were named.
question in the context of emphasizing that economic policy
would have a auch greater affect.
In so doing, flillett axemolifias a conceot to be intro-
duced in this chaoter, that of seeing the national interests
as an output of decision making: "Ir the U.S. does x, its
in teres- s won't be endangered; thay will be anhanced." It
is more accurate to treat tham as an input: "This action is
in our interest, enacting oolicy x will enhance the national
ir t e r est
20

Schools of ^hought arose accDcling to whrth?r or r.ot
national intecBSTis wers sjbj9ctiv3 ^r obi^otive, Beli^v^rs
ir. th€ national int9r==3t as subj?ctiv? prefsrences that
Changs along yfith the aspirations of a nation's members are
appropriately known as sub jectivists. Ob j =ct ivists , on the
other hand, lold tha* in teres- shoal i be based on a descri-
bable objec-^-ive reality such as povr = r.
Whether the motivator is goals for th? future, or the
seeraing "objeotive reality" of po^f^r, it is difficult to
escape that na-'-ional interests a.r intiiiately related to
values and idaals.
Hans Morgsnthau labored extensively to brina •^he concept
down to ear-h by following the philosophy that "the kind of
interest determining political ac^ioa in a particular period
of history depends upon the political and cul*:ural context
within which foreign policy is formulated.'' This recognition
of "political and cultural context" is the strongest quality
of Morgenthau's work, for he goes on to essentially ignore
that values and ideals do play a significant role in the
backaround of the political and cilrural context. Shirkina
•p-rom moral abstractions. Mcraenthau accused moralism
divorcing -^.hought from action. :i e preferred to clincj to
the more macho abstraction of pow=r, a somewhat observable
premium, as a viable determinant of interests.
Abstaining from or fighting for pow^r, or takina sides
with abstainers or fighters, help to explain action mor^
concretely than could moralistic terms; power has had
history to back it up. Morgenthai held that the moralist
openly used moral principles, not national interests, as a
guide for action. As an example; he offers Woodrow Wilson,
who was lucky that "th- objective force of na'-.ional inter-
:ould == caoe. . . i moosed uoon himeo _.^
,
as
wn1- - h 10 rational t. a-
o o 'a_ ^ "rthe object of his moral indignation th=^




-.o d = 3trov rh= Kaiser also happsn^i id
be in U.S. poli^.ical int^r^sts.
Bu^ th*? i5sa9 should not bs whether powar strugal<TS or
moral abstractions determine the national interests. Nor is
it proclaiming the better way to determine interests for the
country. For it is true -hat power struggles are a reality
in international affairs whether, through the American
historical accident, we have ba«n exempt from tham or not.
Even moralists who do not operate jnier the oower code are
capable of acting in the national iiterest. Moreover, many
nations talk their brand of opinion on non-interference and
anti-imperialism, be it morally or power based. Infinite
quotes can be cited exemplifying all combinations of contra-
dictions in thouaht, speech, actions and results. These
will be provided in a later chapter.
B. DEFINITIONS
Virciiia Held is one autnor who produced a loose
definition after a much more worthwhile lead-in to it in her
book, ;^he Publio I nterest and Iidiv^duaZ. Int erests . It
reads as follows: '• X is in th? interest of I (neans -^.hat) a
claim by or in behalf of I for X is asserted as justifi-
able." Having cited various academics' definitions of
"interest" and "individual interest," H«ld elaborated on
three theories:
(1) preponderance: The artion is in the public in-merest if
the majority of individual interests support this action.
(2) common iiterest: An ac+ ion is in the pablic interest
only if it is common " o the individual interests of =^ach
one.
(3) uritarv conceptions: th«=^re is a unitary coherent system




Held'5 work is ons of the lost thorough and in = -^hcd-
ical discussions on det^^rmining tii role of *:h=^ oublic in
ths national intrr^st, 3inc=? tha public is the lirqsat
plurality among all those who would be considered -c h =.v e a
voice in the lational interest, her task was monumental. The
only shor-^-ccming in her work, outsiir of the oyer-gen = rality
of the compact definition, is one that cannon be overcome:
there is no way to conjecture the interests of those in the
public who ar9 without a spokesman *Raf. 6: p. 36].
2- T <^t i ' s Procedural Out outs
A mere workable hypothesis was CDmposed by Dr. Frank
Teti for his students in a seminar di the national interests
a- the Naval Postgraduate School, ionterey, California. I*
proposes that "the national interests are the outpu-^s of a
policy-making procedure tha*- satisfy national needs as
d<=^fined by thr problematic context, in a legitima*.e manner
that will result in domestic coropliaics." In its way, this
single sentence er.capsulat e s much of the accomplishments of
volumes of "talking around" the subject of the national
interests. Its components name concepts that do creat<= ar:
idea of what national intsres^s ara in terms of what they do
(satisfy national needs), how they 3o it (-through a policy-
making procedure), and what should happen when, it is done.
(It should result in domestic compliance.) This last
element imposes a kind of "check" on a decision to verify if
it is in fact a national interest. But since a foreign
Dclicy decision can be popular at the time of formulation
and later yield results averse to ioiestic compliance, this
part of the definition presents a problem.
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a. Utility of the Definition
Th? workability of thr statement consists in ^he
following: if national intsrssts ara to be defined, national
needs mast be determined; the statene.i t • s tern "problematic
context" allocs for perceptions of those who will enumerate
the needs in a situation. It must i3t be specified who these
"enumeratcrs of needs" are; their identify should remain an
unstated, independent variable whose correla-icn with
national interests will fluctuate depending on the strength
of the other "enumerator" variables working with it on the
problem. For purposes of this thesis, however, those who
would determine needs range froi the television-watching
public, to the bureaucratic organizations, on ud to the
executive branch of the aovernient.
The na* ional deoen wn^ n
conceiving cf them in terms of a particular problematic
context and ipon which of those nenticned oulls -he sncst
weight in that context.
b . Cb j e ct i n
A major objection to the definition is that, as
an "output," it is a product of something else. It would
better be seen (although thus less easily defined) as that
which justifies the procedures and the decisions made, i.e.,





























































































































Having considsrsd tha abcv9 ccmmants on -.h =
element cf "output". Professor TBti's definition migh- b~
modified thus: "The national intsrssts are inr^uts
-^o a
policy-making procedure that satisfy national n=-9ds as
defined by th9 problematio context, in a legitimate man
that may cr mav not result in domestic compliance."
TJie concep- must allow for the infl*:enc
changing decision-makers and their moral cr power-political
inclinations, or combinations tharaof. The el=ment of
domestic compliance pres-nts a douoLs problem of the defini-
tion of "domestic" and of what, or how long "comoliance" is
supposed to apply. However, with the national interasts as
an input to iecision-makii g, comoliance about considering
the interest is not as difficult to achiava. After the
passage of time, results of the decision based on the
particular interest may c-hange from compliance to non-
compliance or vice versa. This is not an insurmountable
problem as long a s it is kept in mind that with national
interests consid9red as an input, it implies a futurity and
uncertainty as to the compliance part of the defini"ion.
Results will not always be as wished, or interpreted as
such. This is the casa in the already cited example of
conflict over Reagan's belief that it is in the national
interest tc -transfer arms to foster political stability. The
results of such a policy may, now Dr in the future, easily
be argued to have done exactly the opposite.
information is increasingly available. more intellectual
viewDcints are considered, as are those of the public,
enlightened or o-^-herwise. In this orocess tnere is a
gr'=^ater ODoort unity for contradiction and confusion,
exoosed "^cr the world's oerusal, aoparently it never
to' Americans that it may' be in our national i-t.teres-s tc_*r7
*2 =5^'^ ou'"'=-l7='S as do those with whom w= are in-^-erac-^mcr.
instead we insist that all will believe our morally based
notives as we do, regardless of whether they curtail or
=ncouraae whatever U.S. involveaent objectionable to tn^









Wh^'-^her SDme-.hir.g i.s a national ir.-Brs3t or is in -.h9
national intersst is similar to
-:i= argurasnt of whether a
psrscn lov<?s someone or is in lova with another. For
example, it is a U.S. national int^Urst
-ha^ hamar. rights b-r
practiced universally, it may be so for oar "selfish" in-^^r-
ests of comfortable political ani =conoraic stability that
arise mere readily out of non-repressive regimes, but it is
a a.S. natioial interest nonetheless, Dn the other hand,
human rights has not proven to D5 ^n the -J.S. national
interest because it has resulted i:i oth = r than the desired
or even expected results of accused nations seeing the light
and then behaving properly so as to "marit" a.3. atten-ion,
be it in the form of military or economic assistance.
The withholdin.g of arms from Latin American human rights
violators brought outcomes that would have been naive not to
expect. Not the least of those results included unilateral
cutting off of military assistance programs on the par-^ of
Brazil, the tremendous expansion of its own arms industry,
and the diversification of aras suppliers by other Latin
American countries. Th=se results may be seen as non-
detrimental. 3ut in the argument of whether an action is in
the national interest or a national interest oer se, results
make the difference. For if a policy aCrion is in the
national interest, the national interest is an outpu*. That
is, the result is in the national interest. Whereas if a
policy ac-^ion and a national int-rest are one and the same,
the result will be due to the national interest as an input
to the process of decision making. For example, human
rights and arms transfers can be considered both national
interests and policies. If the two had been treated sepa-
rately by the Carter administration, and the decision on
policy had been different, the effect on cur relations with
recipient country Brazil might not lave suffered as badly.
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Eelow is ari a^tenipt a- a graphic dspictior. of *,h^
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First, there a re t hose that remala abstractions and are
treated with a "concrete" but unrelated policy that also
happens tc be in the national intersst. Doing this migh-^ not
completely hiader the result, but the achievement of the
result is more accidental than plaiisd.
Sscond, an abs-ract national intarast is treated more
fluidly and is less likely to have ap. adverse effec*.
Third, a l<=s; abstract national iatsrest is treated with a
policy that is more dir=ctly r-^latei -o it. Again, -^he
results, as with the P.eagaa arms transfer policy, ar*:^ deba-
table, but the aims are [nore clearly defined, and analys-^s
may better identify prcblems if distinctions between the
interes-s, the possible ways *:o ichieve th^m, and the
desired results.
Another question about the approach to the discussion of
the national interests arises m an article by Arthur
Whi- = ker en the '"=^^ter:. Hemisoh-r^ iira. '^nil^ z"^ - '•^r'^
r> a 1ion a
writ mg. t re a t s 'f perception cf the o f t en-t er med
27

"special r - lat i onsh i p" between "^h? [Jr;i*=i s** - „ q -X. r-=
Rio jTbt. i9. Thi3 p=:ro = D-i3r. wis ir.fli-^: 1 7
-hs moralis-, ia = alist =nd realist vi=-ws noi-^^i-i cu- bv
Morg<=n-hau. rhs author shows that in ths courss of Americ^r.
his^.ory, U.S. /Latin Am?ricar. foL'^igr policv w-s crac^ic^d
acoordir. g to noral, ideal, or r = al in. cl i nation- c^ 'h- co^'^r
elit<=. "^ [Fcf. 7: p. 1] The par-Loaiaj 5igr.: fioar.c^ in -h^s
ar-.icl? is -hi~ the author -akrS oiUr "r furr.i~h -h<= r^^ad?-
wi*h a warnir.3' that shcula con a to nine wh = ~?VTr *"h-r= are
debates or ideals, valu = =, and n=*:ior.al interes-.s. Tha*
warning consists in -he distinr-i^n of an idea froni a
policy, and a policy from a progra:i.
In trea-.ing the problem of human righ":- *n La-^in
America, and especially con centra"^ing on Brazil, -he policv
of ariris resnrain- looms as a link. Since both can be
considered national interests and oolicies, several gues-
tions can be asked: Which of the two was a national
interes"^? Which was more aoproor iat ely in 'rhe national
interes-? Once th= i:!ea= would be distinguished from the
p-^licy, which of these wtuld be -^r.e prcgrar?.? Consider the
following: th-^- pracnice of worldwide, anti-torture is a
national in-eres- of -^.he y. S. , whirh. can he called an idea,
a value, a ?oal, or an ideal; the policy which the U.S.
formulated to (?^fect the elimination of torture was the
human rights policy; and the program of the policy was to
withhold arns iransfers "o any countries tha"^- violated the
human rights policy. The idea, the policy, and th= proaram
sit mav be better said tha- the United States dealt with
the r eaion * accor dingly, fnr a "cDlicv" on -^hat v=ry broad
area known as Latin ' America is virtjally non-existent exceot
in a fraainen'^ed wav, and rightlv so, considering the diver-
sitv of i-s nations an'' regions. The (J. 3. has reac-^ed
separately in Latin America due to the U.S. tendency toward
crisis ma na cieie n t and \\ hoc d^'CisLon makina which has led
to a non-delib =r at e recoani^ion of Latin America's dis-inc-
"tions. The U.S. dovsrniien- should iiolomat ically
ackncwledae hr.^ describe i-s own behavicr and develop a
Dolicv whereir. it would eta-e a broad Lati" American area
concep- as well as ar^a or country distinctions.
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w^r9 r.o^ r^sprc-ri fcr ziszt-c-ic-^, Thr or^c^.ic= cf h-::aa-
riah'^s was sucooss^. to nacric^llv D~c'jr wi-h
-h= c'ir~= i I:",-'"*'
cf ".S. ^r'^s. This ii". -o^, hr-pp^n, ?-i, rcir ciir ?.- al Iv , co-h
haii.3.r. righ-s viclat icr? c=3lir. =d, =r:d =r:n?? w-r^ qui-- - = silv
obtain?'! elr^wh^ra or -ro5uc~^ wi-.-ir. -h= CT'ir.'ri?? "owirds
wh ich irirs ?'=l-s w^r*^ ^-ci'-'-a---'^
Anctr^r s^s^cia-icr -ripl-t mi;-- br aic^-, c: --ri ou- i-
a
tc
-. h9 rr---'^ if th~ ^h~-is in li7!-. -. ^t !. •:-^ = - riir.-s =s =
n5.ticT:al ii:-irrs-: ar-. \v- UT^ling Aii-;. i ..-i.i::; = l in-=rt3t/
ii^al, CUT of which d^v-rlDDs ^ ctjlicv -3 i!irk= ths.- iir=l ^
reality, and which brings r^^sulns rfhich r^tav -.o^ b- i" nh^
r.ational in ^rr'^s-?
Such a pracnic* of policy ma'cing based on a •^a-i'^^al
int^T'^sn as a lofnv id=al only acci f. =ntally r = = :il"^s in nhT
Z'-aliza'-ior of th^ '^a'^io'"^^ 2_r — Qf-tiir ^on 'w^'so" ''*" wo**'''^''
For Car-^-^r, i- didn'-. A.s abov?, i- is b-c=u=^ 12 allcw^.nc^s
W9r= mad= -c distinauish trfo pclici^H. ~h=^ a: t, cf -h^ Car-?r
policy was -o fostc^r huiian rich"?. Tc havr Tn=C"^ = d i^
"hhrouch anc-.her oolicv, =r:!is nran-frC, =li rrinan ^d imoornann
dr li b«?ran ions such as an =p. uncian i~n, und€ rs-andabla no nha
tjublic, 0"*^ how hunian riah"^. s via ariis denial was ccnsid^'Tsd
^'^ j^= ^-n — ^-2 '^^^'ic'^^l i'^n — E'^s",
Logicallv, haman rights policy snoulc r-suln in huiian
3ricT'"'~s o'~-c~ic9' i — -"e "n^n sf€n r^nlicv shrul'^ n-sul~ in —h"
trrnsfsr '^'" r^s-^-in"^ '"" -rcis. T^is '- n"- -" -av ""ha- -h~
human righns policy was =ntir=:ly anr=:asonfel. "The iudgm^..-
that arms -ransfsr policy could result in -ha pracnice of
human rights was attributable tc n.i- noral viarf eguivalsnt
to the attituda "be nice to ma or ycu won't gen any
goodies." Eminently insulted, Latin Americans spent their
pennies elsewhare. Damaged relations due nc nhis evangelical
paternalism ware grievous at the ti.Tia, bu"-. no*: irrevocable.
Latin American countries are at a lavel of sophisnica* ion
high enough to recognize nhair own futura potential to
29

withhold goods for various reasons, 5V9n moral or.es. The
ur.i^rlying lessor, for tha United States in varyina for^iar.
policy approaches is to it-t-empt tD discern how the policy
will be rec*i'/ed. Human righ*s moralisra marketed in a less
paternalistic fashion may have suco5=dad.
The preceding digression lends :o thes? conclusions:
(1) If "^he rnodified Teti dafiriticn is deoicied graphically,
i" can easily incorporate the advica of Whitaker.
(2) To ".he marriage of whitaker's ind Teti's concep^^s, nigh^
be add«=-d the use of results of a program as inputs to a
refined idea, to initiate a new policy, throuah a revised
program.
Whitaker : idea ( 1) policy program
Tet i : output procedure compliance




III. POLICY MMII THINKING ON LAI IN AMERICAN NATIONAL
INTERESTS
A. INTPODOCTION
This chapter considers ths "Bilist, iiaalist, and
moralist classif icat ior.= of forsign or othar policy mak:?;rs
and gives examples of those ways of thinking as appli-?'^ to
Latin America?, policy froi\ the early days of our country to
the preser."^ . They prove that while i-^ is converient and
human to label a politician into one of those or any other
categories, no particular philosophy proves to be mor®
effective in acting in the national interests. whil^ th=
realist can reap mere credit th=i less pragmatic policy
makers when he is proven by history to have beer, "right", he
looks the wors.t when that is not "-he case. To the o-her
extreme, the moralist always sounis "right", bat his poli-
cies are so abstract that results too cf"^en aopear as
accidents, no-^. as easily applicaolr to his conscious plans.
When accidents are no-^ in his favor, he is the most vulner-
able to blame. The idealist hints at morality in his policy
and of*en may act in a power-political fashion [ Ref . 10: p.
836]. Right or wrong, he will always have good intensions
in his favor. This works rhetorically, bu^ not ?.lwavs poli*-.-




B. THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE IDEA
Befors goinq into specifics, it is of in-t==-rTst -^.o
provide one author's outlook on "T^e Wssterr. Hemisphere
Idea. Basically, the western Henispher? idea holds that
"-he United States and Latin Amerioa are bound together in a
special relationship to the exclusion of +ha political and
economic influence of Europe and th= rest of the
non-American *orld." [Ref. 7: p. 161] The idea was shared
in Latin America, and lasted both -here and in the U.S,
despite much dissent from the ^imes of the Founding Fa-^.hers
through the progressive =ra ending just prior to World War
II. Just after the Second World War, however, *he id=a
started to decline.
The separation of the American from the European sphsr^
was stressed by Jefferson which explains why some Ideals of
commonality prevailed later, Adams, on -he o-^.her hand, was
averse to the id*a that there could be such a *!hing as an
American systsm. If there wer'^- OQr, he felt the United
Sta-es "constitute the whole of it,..ther= is no community
of interests between North and South America," he declared
on Independence Day in 1321 [Ref. 7: pp. 16U-1S5].
C. REALISTS
One early realist, personifisd by Alexander Hamilton,
chose "self-preservation as the first duty of a nation" over
the moral concepts of treaty obligations, gratitude, and
affinity to ai ally. He acted as he spoke.
John Adams provides thought to ba resurrected years
later in one of the first at-^empts at policy wi-^h Latin
America, the Monroe Doctrine. Background to the Monroe
Doctrin9 includes this message from President Adams to











































It IS very true that we oug ht nc^ — r'
v=3 in the politi c=l system of Europe
,
but
Ives always dis tiiot and sep arate frcT!
9 may consider ourselvrs, th e m aritime pr -J
ers of the world will con si rta- '- >io rj- i ^'<Lfl
ica as foriiing a weight in t hat balanc e jf
ope, which can i57sr be fo raott'^n or
would not only be againsi: cu r' inter es-"^
be doing wrong t Dne half of Eurcp e at
should volun-ar ily throw cur se Ives' into
It is a natural policy for a nation. that
neutral, to consult with cth a ^ r^ » +• ' ons
,
e same studies anl pursuit 3 a t" the' sam e
. 8: p. 301 ]
k
The Monroe Doctrine was quoted in its principal passages
by both Gantep.bein and Bemis. ^ p^e latter adds to Adams'
address that "The text of the Jlcaro= Doctrine its = l^ has
overshadowed the diplomatic communications which were 3iai =
at the time -^o Russia and to Great Britain." The ccmmunica-
tions were sinilar to the words of th= president before his
Congress twenty-six years before. A passage called "obser-
vations on the Communications recently received from the
Minister of Russia," statei that th= U.S. governmen-^ did not
want to meddle with European policy in -he propagation of
its own principles and modifying of its government according
to its own judgments.
"It had recognized the established independence of the
former Spanish colonies and entered in'-.o political and
commercial relations with them, 'relations -^-he more
important tc the interests of th= United States, as the
whole of thDse emancipa*:ed regions are situated in their
own Hemisphere,' and as the most extensive, ocpulous and
powerful of {;=. new Nations are in their immediate
vicinity: and one of them bordering upon the Territories
of this Union." [Ref. 9: p. 65]
6For the definitive studv on the Monroe Doctrine se-




• Th? M2GL22 Do ctring
The following excerpts froin the Monroe Doctrine
encapsulate major ideas: enunciatsi in an annual message
from the president to Congress, December 2, 1823, from para-
graph 7, msg of Dec 2, 1823: "...the American continents, by
the free and indep<=ndent condition which thay hav^ assumed
and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as
subjects for future colonization by aiy European powers..."
"It was Stat ad
that a are at
Portuaa 1 to impr
countfi es . .. in "-
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Several decades later, Benis explains, "Theodore
I^oosevelt confused the Latin American policy of the United
States by identifying intervention in the Dominican Republic
with the Monroe Doctrine, thus making that Doctrine, which
had said 'hands off to Europe, 39?m to say 'hands on' for
the United States." [Ref. 9: p. 157] But the doctrine
neither gave to nor withheld from the United Spates a right
or policy of intervention. "But President Roosevelt tha*
because the Monroe DoctrinB prohibits! European intervention
to secure justice, it ought tc follow as a logical corollary
that it sanctioned intervention oy the United States in
order tc prevent it by Europe."
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2- The Rpps jvelt £2^2=1111
On February 15, 1905, presented th^ "pro-ocol" to
the Senate. With this corollary zo the Monroe Doctrine
outgrew the policy of "-h^ "Big Stick": benevolent Unitei
States intervention to prevent non-inericar. intervention.
"An a ggr ievsd nation can wi-hout
Monroa Dcctri ne take what action
ad jus -meTit of its disputes wi t
provi
_ er en
ced •^ha-^ action does no- -ak e
C«' with their form of :
Ibspo ilm OT»- '^ f t he ir t er r itory un
i
i
short of^'"this , when the question
claim *t h^ onl 7 way wh ich remains.
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niv a tamp
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seizure of te rrit orv. disauised
event uai.ly of fer the only way i .1
:juest ion, cai c cllect any deb-s. a
rerence on the oart of the United s
157]
interferina with "^he
•^x sees fit in the
h American Stat^-s,
the shape of inter-
ve''"nm— n~ o^ o'^ •'v —
r anv disguise. But,
is*on=r of a money
finally, to collect
or the seizure of the
s in effect a pcsses-
rarv posssssion, of
becomes a party in
a do'™ — '*'''"^ ''^ can '^c'^
ermanen-.iy occupy *:he
lies; and ye-^ 'such
or undisauised, may
which tha oower in
nless there is inter-
tatas." [Ref. 9: p.
3 . Dollar Diplo macy
Carrying th© Roosevelt Corollary toward a more
active and less disinterested int arven-ion , notably in
Nicaragua, tha term "dollar diplomacy", according "-.o Bemis,
was a stigma placed on Taft and lis Secretary of State,
Philander C. Knox. It was easy to do so since the presiden"-.
frankly avowed that he considered it a most useful function
of government to advance and protect the legitimate trade
investments of United States citizens in foreign countries.
However, Bemis feels "It was not designed to profit private
interests. It was intended rather to support the foreign
policy of the United States; in the instance of Latin
America to sjpport the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe
Doctrine."" As far back as those tiiies, Bemis continues, "In
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th^ss intervsntions in Cantral A3i = rica and th=- Caribbean
there was also a cer-^.ain characteristic missionary impulse
to help the people themselves. .. by s-abilizing their govern-
men-s and ecoiomies." ^ [Rof. g; p, isi]
The misinterpretation of -he Monroe Doc-rine
resulted in fitting accusations of imperialism on the part
of the United States, and is a sterling example of how
realism is not always in the national interest.
D. IDEALISTS
The id'ealist was judged by Mcrgenthau to have achieved
the nation's best interest of seL
f
-pres Brvation although
verbalizing morally about actions ii the national in-^.erests.
Political thought sounded differ ant from self- preserving,
power-conscicas political action, bit they merged in the end
when policy was made [Ref. 10: p. 343]. In this paradox was
born the American art of acting in self-interest while
expounding universal altruism.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his administration
attempted to rescue U.S. /La tin American relatior.s from impe-
rialist accusations. On February U, 1936, at "Th'= Trade
Agreements Program in our Inter-Ansrican Relations," FDR's
Assistant Secretary of State, Su-nner Welles, discussed
"interest in, and appreciation of value of inter-American
relationships; there exists a greater realization on the
part of the people of the Onited States of the value to
themselves of a sure political and coinmercial understanding
with the other republics of this hemisphere." In preceding
decades there had prevailsd a mistrust of J.S. objectives,
"a justifiable resentment of the high-handed or patronizing
atti-'-ude of this government, and an equally definite resent-
Roosevelt and the^Also see George dowry's "Theodore
Progressive Movement" and Pringle's Theodore R22§§Iili»
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men- of +:h'r *:ariff policy pursue! by tha United St^-.-rS,
which mad? i-^ impossible for aiy fi:a9 flow of gocis b<=tw9an
their countries and ours." Armed intervention exacerbated
this.. .also general misconception of the Monro? Doctrine,
"erroneous interpretation of that doctrine by . . . citizens
in high official positions." Welles also brought up how in
the hundred plus years of declared independence, we had
ignored Latin American priie in history and traditions, and
resentment cf our attempts to dictate what course they
should fellow and intervene in their iomes^ic concerns.
While not a pontifical, Wilsonian moralist, FDR was
known to speak as from the pulpit:
"Peace comes from the spirit and must be arounded in
faith. In seeking peace, perhaos wa can bes*: beain bv
proudly affirming the faith of the Americas: the'faithm freedom and its fulfillment which has proved a miahtv
fortress beyond reach of successful at^.ack in half'^he
world.
"Tha- fai-^h arises from a common hope and a comn^on
design given us by our fathers in differing form but
with a single aim: freedom and security of the indi-
vidual, which has become the foundation of our peace.
"If... we cai give greater freedom and fulfillm'^n* tc -^he
individual liv'S'S or our citizens, the democratic form cf
representative government will live justified the hiah
hopes of the liberating fathers. Democracy is still the
hope of the world. If 'we in our generation can con-inue
its successful applications in ::he Americas, it will
spread and supersede other methods by rfhich men are
governed and which seem to most of us .c run counter to
our ideals of human liberty and human progress."
[Hef. 8: p. 177]
In that speech, P.oosavelt had enunciated the reali'ries
of trade interests: "Interwoven with these problems is the
further self-evident fact that the welfare and prosperity of
each of cur nations depeid in large part on the benc-'^its
derived from commerce =3iong ourselves and with ether
nations, for our present civilization rests en the basis of
an international exchange of commodities." [Ref. 8: p. 17t»]
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Sumner Welles discusssi a laior contribj-iDn of th^ FDP.
adminis-raticn to Latin American policy:
"... Our new policy of the 'good neiahbor» has b^enpredicated noon the belief of this Sovernme'^t tha- -^h<='^«i
should exist an in'^er-^ mer ican oolitical '-ela tionsh- dbased on a recognition cf actual and ro- r Vipq"^*^-^ ic?" 1
equality betweei the American republics; on a ccmpl«^-eforbearance frcm interference by iny one "republic in the
, -. .-- -
— 3 of any other; -jq eccnciic cooperation;
and, finally, on the common realization tha'': in -^he
domestic concerns :
.d * i^^i i " i ~n2." "> "n^
vrorld at , large all of the American republics confront
the same international problems, ar.d tha. in their r<=la-
tions with ion -American' ocwers, 'ihe -welfare ard secu"^ity
of anv one of them cannot be a mac*-er of in d*" f f =-^<=rcc~-
o
the others." [Ref. 8: p. 167]
Welles goes on to enumerate thr=e years of achievement in
a-taining these objectives, including that "'dollar diplo-
macy '...is a *-hing cf the past." [Ref. 8: p. 168] A Pan
American Day Address by Cordell Hull, Franiclin Roosevelt's
Secretary of State, before the governing board of the Pan
American Unioi, at Washington, April 14, 1 9U4 exemplifies
our tendency to equa-^e our ideas on freedom with those of
the Latin Americans, appearing hypocritical after the state-
ment on endeavoring to recognize "irtual and not theoretical
equality.
"
"Inter-Amerioan unity was not brought about by force ...
was n?t produced by nations witi a homogeneous racial
origin... does not deoend upon the bonds of a common
language or a culture based on i common literature or
common customs and hab its , . . (I) nt ernational American
unity Droves that there are other sources. .. which offer
hope to a world.. .Our unity comes from a passionate
devotion to human liberty and national independence
which is so strong that it does not stop with the effort
of each people to secure liberty for itself but goes on
to respect is no less valid the desire of other peoples
to achieve the same liberty in accordance with their own
traditions and historic "institutions. Although -^he
lanauaqe of Bolivar and San Martin was different from
that of Washington and Jeffersoi, thev were expressing
the same Pirposes and principles, and they led their
countrymen'along the same paths," [Ref- 8: p. 245]
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It is intsrasting to cbserva th? "co-Droduct ions" of
rhatoric bori out of In^i^r-Aisrican confsrenoes at which
leaders from both Americas were prasait. Running t h<= aamut
of philosophias, they damonstrate the southern understanding
of what our northern Western hemispheric aars love to hear.
They talk of equality:
"...At. the Montevideo conference in 1933, -^he American
republics affirmed their beliaf in certain essential
orincioles upon which cooperatiDi oetween nations and
international order must be based. "...Th- principle
-hat every nation, large and small, was eaual before "-he
law of nations." Every nation had the right to "develop
its own institutions, free from intervention by others."
[Ref. 8: p. 819]
a. The Rio Pact
The Inter American Treaty for Reciprocal
Assistance, also ^cnown as "the Rio ?act", is a straightfor-
ward attemp- at North and South American alliance:
"The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack
by anv state aaainst. an American State shall be consid-
ered as an at"^.ack against all tae American States and,
con.sequently , each one of rhe said Contracting Parties
under.akes to assist in meeting the attack in the exer-
cise of the inherent right of the individual or
collective self-defense..." [ Ref . 8: p. 822]
b. The Act of Chapultepec
The Act of Chapultepec also declares that "every
attack of a State against the integrity or inviolabili-^y of
the territory, or against the sovereignty or political inde-
pendence of ai American State shall be considered as an act
of aggression against all the American States." [Ref. 8 p.
818] It also states that "the new situation in the world
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makes more imparativs than sv^r ths anion and soli'iarity of
th9 Americar. o^oples, for the defsnsa of -.hair riahts ani
tha maintenance of international peace..." It urges ^hat
they continue to incorporate the principles of proscription
of territoriil conquest; condemation of intervention,
internal or external, and ir introduces the element of the
"personality" of the Americas: "The recogni^.ion that
respeci for the personality, sovereignty and independence of
each American State constitutes the essence of international
order sustained by continental solidari'ry . . . " [Ref. 3: p.
817]
c. The Declaration of Ayacucho
The Declaration of Ayaoicho, a pronouncement at
which no U.S. North Americans *ere present, contains
elements of the three philosophies, and is not a foreign
policy per se, but an accurate enunciation of Latin American
interests.
Since it is in our national interests to look
forward to Latin America as a possible area of regional arms
restraint, all x^orth American comaants on the Declaration of
Ayacucho emphasize the arms restraint ir.ten-^ions contained
therein. It makes an interesting digression to examine some
excerpts and to note that there are only four paragraphs out
of twenty-two in the entire declaration that talk of arms.
*?hile it is true that this was to be the main thrust of the
document, in the minds of its preparers, it is obvious that
they had an econoaic message to record:
"Me declare that:
"Our coun-^ries achieved their oolitical independence,
but their integration into the world economy subse-
quently gave rise to various foms of droendence, which
exolain tha obstacles to our economic", social, and
cultural development.
"There is an urgent need to finish the task of emancina-
*',ion by shaping our destiny in tha economic and social




calls for a ccninon will . . . bas'=^d on soliiai-i^'v ^ nd
rscogni-^ion of its pluralism..."
Ths emphasis on pluralism whila ?ni3avoring to mair.tain
unity and solidarity punctuate an \in=?ricar. idsnti-y similar
to that of th3 0.3. Tha sagment bslow is reminiscent of our
"malting pot":
"Latin American nationalism reprasants tha awakening of
our peoples to the daoth of thair being and to -heir
true personility, which is the Duicorae of the mingling
of blood, of the merrring of cultures and of common
historical, social, and'econonic exoerienca."





















































































































































Once again, the concept of economic security through self'
determination emerges:
"The crea"^i3n of a socia
making powers requires
,y with full national decision-
al! end to economic dependence
through the determination and achiaveraent of development
objectives appropriate to the real needs of aach o^ our
peoples.
"The full exercise of sovereignty over their own natural
resources, protection of the prices of raw materials,
ragula-^-ion ^f foreign investment and control over the
activities of transnational corporations are inalienable
rights of our countries.
"•X ^•••cgra'^ "i on is the most effective instrument of (Jevel-
opmeii- and ensures economic independence by linking
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national 5ffor-s to the complim^^nra^i^-y of i^u^
aconomi'=?s. - -- -^
I
acuta world
^, economic crisis manifssts "-hs
L.
. .
tor "ha establishment of i systam of coll^c^iv*
Lomic security which will raaice oossibl* the ir'^^q-a'ilopment of peoples for th=ir' wall-be^ na, ^p a
"The ^ 9 e ^he





_ f ree from threats" 'ana' coercion
that might undermine it, in ocier to ach^ ^'v*' a ti«='winternational economic order which must be bis<='d on the
equity, equality, sovarsignty , interdependence. commoninterest, and co-operation of all States." fRef. 11:
pp. 54-56] *-
2« Ideolo'jy and Human Right s
In the realm of modern foreign policy on Latin
America, a prepared statement of Judge Thomas Buergenthal,
Dean of Washington Collage of Law, American University,
emphasizes th? importance of ideas, linking human rights and
the national interest, whi::h was ths title of his statement:
"...few othsr U.S. foreign polioy iiitiativas have been
as misund-s^rstood and as poorly articulated as has our
human rights policy. The lev=l of debate on this
subject has been. . .sophomoric, and that is true of the
arguments of its proponents and its opponents. Part of
the blame rests with President Cartar'and the fac* that
he promoted the policy with the righteous rhetoric of a
fundamentalist sermon so that much of the discussion of
the subject took on a moralistic tone. And the few
efforts that were made by the Carter Administra*-ion tojustify the policy to the public in terms of our
national interest did not get much of a hearina..."
It was unfortunate that the articulation of the
human rights policy was not translatable to the national
interest. To Zarter the transition was plain. The denial of
arms would lead to the practice of auman rights, creating a
more contented polity and more suitable climate for democ-
racy. Approaching the other extreme, Reagan's administration





reject a strong human rights policy because they see it
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as having parely moral but v^ry lit'^l«>- if any pol'-^ic*!
significanca.
.
.thsy contend 4hat tha U.S. fac^s 'aformidable adversary in Soviet =xpan3ioni3in and cani^o*





the U.S. r.seds alliss and cannot afford ^o
alienate friendly an ti- communist gover nffl<=^"^s c-ve*' *'
'
they are repressive..."
Buergenthal stresses the importance of the role of
morality and values in a.S. ideology, which has beer a point
of contention in determination of the national interest.
Both authors and practitioners of power-based national
interests hav® already been discussed. Once the air of
debate settles, one is impressed that the power struggle
aoproach to world affairs essentially consis'-s in the mutual
abhorrence for the concepts supported by our governors.
Thus, ideology proves to be at the root of the bipolar
conflict. 8
"I aaree that the Sovi=t Union and what it stands for
presents ths most serious threat to the (J.S. national
interest. Eut the threat is not oilv military or subver-
"If we do not qrasp the political and emotional signifi-
cance of the human" rights movement, we shall forfeit the
only real competitive" advantage w2 have in the struagle
to contain Soviet expansionism and counteract its influ-





As has been msntioned, Morgsnthaa ir.-roduccd •^.h'= concept
of a moralist acting accidentally in the national int^rsst,
exemplified by Woodrow Wilson. r:i Latin American policv,
regarding the mili+-ary revolt of Victoriano Huerta in
Mexico, Wilson added a new principle to the La~in American
policy of the United States: opposition to governments
established by force in violation of rhe constitution and
against the will of the people. It declared *:hat he wished
to "cul-ivate the friendship and deserve the confidence of
cur sister republics of Central and South America, and to
promote in every proper and honorable way the ir.-^erests
which are conmon to the peoples of the two continents."
[Ref. 9: p. 175] He held "that just government rests always
upon the consent of the governed, and that there can be no
freedom without order based upoa law and upon the public
conscience and approval." Through autual respect and help-
fulness we would lend our influeioe to the realization of
those principles.
"...knowing that disorder, personal intrigues, and defi-
ance of constitutional rights weaken 'and discredit
crovernmen"^ and injure none so much as the people who are
unfortuna-^e enough to have th^ir ooamon life and their
common affairs so tainted and disturbed. We can have no
sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of
government to advance their own personal interests or
am b it ion. .
.
"The United States has nothing to seek in Central or
South Am<^rica except the lasting in-erests of *he
peoples of the two continents, the security of aovern-
ments intended for the people and for no special group
or interest, and the development of personal and trade
relationships between the ^wo continents which shall
redound to the orofit and advantage of bn+:h and inter-
fere with the' rights and liberties of neither."
[RGf. 9: p. 175].
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1 • Car;^erls Human Rights Poli^Z
Onc9 again, the Carter axecation cf human rights
surfaces as the soon to be classic example of inoralism aoing
sour. While President Carter is inevitably associated with
the human rights policy, the fact is tha- it had been drawn
up and discussed during *'he decade before his presidency.
Being a morally inclined individual, and the one to actually
sign the convention, he was the optimal candidate to be its
standard bearer.
2« Kissinger on Human R icrht g
Following are exemplary diplomatic expressions of
Henry Kissinger, a statesman in office closer in time to the
origins of human rights as a policy. Not known for his
moralism, Kissinger reveals that for a mixed audience, he
can champion American ideals with the best of them. The
following excerpts were taken from his statement before the
General Assembly of the Organization of the American States,
in which he appeals to liberty being the heritage of our
collective civilization, referring to "our" hemisphere as
"the hope of all mankind." [Ref. 13: p. 1]
"The oreciojs common heritage of our Western Hemisohere
is the conviction that human beings are the subjects,
not the objects, of public policy, that citizens must
not become mere instruments or ths state.
"This is.. .the commitment that has made oolitical
freedom and individual dignity the constant and cher-
ished ideal of the Americas and the envy of nations
elsewhere. It is the ultimate proof that our countries
are linked by more than geographv and the impersonal
forces of history.
"Resoect for the rights of man is written into the
founding documents of every nation of our hemisphere."
[Ref. 13: p. 1 ]
as

He coitinaes, discassing tha benefits and pl=Lgue.= of
^hs modern ag?, one of them being ths "yearning for order
even at the expense of liberty" resalting too often in the
violation of the "fundamental standards of hutnane conduct."
Alluding to the specter of the Great External Threat to the
free world by admitting the shortcomings of this age in
eradica-ing "intimidation, terror, and brut ali*: y--foster=d
sometimes frca outside national territories and sometimes
from inside..." [Ref. 13: p. 1] the realist reminds -^hose
present that Communism is the root of all evil.
Secretary Kissinger recommended the strengthening of
the OAS Human Sights Commission so that
"we can deepen our dedication to the soecial qualities
of rich promiss that make our aamisphere a standard-
bearer for freedom-loving people in every quarter of the
globe.
"
"Ax the same time, we should also consider ways to
strengthen the inter-American system in terms of protec-
tion agianst terrorism, kidnaomg, and othar forms of
violent threats to the human" pacsonality, ='spe<
those insoiced from the outside." [Ref. 13: p. Zi ]
^s cially
It was after tha Administrations to which Henry
Kissinger was Secretary of State that the signing of the
American Convention on Human Rignts at the Pan-American
Onion took place. On this occasi:)n. Carter recalled the
conference on Human Rights in Costa Hica where the
Convention was drawn up in 1969, and reminisced that "the
aspirations. .. of human freedom and the responsibility of
government to protect the rights of individuals" [Ref. 14:
pp. 1-5] have existed among all North and South American
countries since their formation.
Carter's "unrealism" was voiced bv his Assistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs, Patricia M . Derian. In her announcement that the
human rights policy had strengthened '3,5. interests in at
least three ways, she proclaimed:
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"First... Our willingness to press for human riqhts pi-oa-
ress among Dur friends, as well as with our adv-^rsa-^ =»«
,
has increased the credibility Df our commitmen-^ -^ofreedom. Thus, our human rights Doicy has a^ne-^'^d




"Second, ths policy helps insur- f'"i9"d''y ^'='la* io"<= '^v*"^the long run with other' countriesT r.''we~muit not espouii
a policy which leads a government to be hostil<= *o"U.S.interests bscause of a.S. ties with a prior regime that
practiced oppression.
'.•Third, our. policy
. .,is the bedrock of our security. It
13 our special commitment to huaan freedom and dignity
that makes as unique. Support for or indifference to
oppression in other countries weakens the foundation O'^
our own democracy at home." [Ref. 15: p. 52]
In entertaining the problem of costs associated with
the application of the policy !0 arms transfers, she
claimed:
"...the policy has produced considerable good will for
the United States throaghout Latin America. Our rela-
tions with constitutional governaents are much closer
than before. And our stand for human rights has won
respect from peoples throughout the hemisphere. Any
possible transitory or short-term loss cf influence with
a particular regime must be balaiced against these more
durable and long-term gains." [Ref. 15: p. 52]
Ms. Derian went on to rationalize that any economic
costs due to applying the policy to arms transfers could be
justified as an investment in the future, for "our policy
has made a major and significant difference— both for the
victims of oppression and for our own national interest."
[Ref. 15: pp. 53]
3 • Reagan * s, ?lon -morali stic Arms PoiiSI
As is in keeping with ths tradition of our unique
exercise of the democratic system, the succeeding presi-
dent's new policy on arms transfers is differing
considerably mi can be attributed to personality, approach,
political party, and conservative iaolinations. His aim is
"Peace through strength", and tie thrust of his arms
a?

transfer poli::y is expressed in th? sentenc?, "Prudently
pursued, arms transfers can strengthen us."
It is perhaps the major distinction of the American
miracle that such change can be absorbed and considered an
improvement rather than a defamation of what has been
changed. The evaluation of "whether approval or denial of
the transfer (of arms) would best prDmote 'the international
recogni-^ion and protection of human rights and freedoms,*"
[Ref . 16: pp. 74-75] is still an important factor in arms
transfer requests,
F. SOMMARI OF U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA
The quotes offered in this chapter were intended to
verbalize our national interests in Latin Aierica. The
latter ones exemplify a means for preserving those interests
through a policy. Some of those national interests, in a few
words, are: aaintenance of the balance of power; collective
security; anti-communism; political stability; preservation
of free trade; economic stability. The following paragraphs
summarize how the citations exemplify the national
interests.
1 . Balanc e of Power
Early disinvolvement with the balance of power gave
way to the p^st World War change of major actors on the
scale. So the balance became a U.S. national interest. The
role of arms transfers in that interest is stated in the
factors that must be considered in evaluating Latin American
arms requests:
"Whether the transfer will strengthen a friendly govern-
ment in areas of oar-^-icular security concern to the
On-'ted S*-a-^2s, suchas the Caribbean Basin and the South
Atlantic, and whether the arms in question would help
deter tne threat of aggression or subversion by our
mutual adversaries in those areas..."
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2- Collec t iv9 Security
"Whether the transfer wilL enhance the recipient's
capability to participate in coLlactive secarity efforts
with the United States" was also cited as a "consideration"
for requests, [Raf. 16: pp. 72-73].
3- Art i-communi sm
U.S. preoccupation with Soviet Communism manifests
itself as wall in the national interest of political
stability: arms transfers must be "consistent wi-h our
interest in maintaining regional Dsace and stability, or
whether it CDald inadvertently contribute -c tensions or
disputes among countries of the region." [Ref. 16: p. 73]
Any instability is seen as a perfsct climate for the intro-
duction of a new ideology. 3d the United States,
incidentally, undertakes to destabilize in Latin America or
elsewhere, when necessary for the preservation of democracy.
** • Free rr ade and Economic Int'^r dependence
Interssts in free trade and sconomic interdependence
were seen enphasized in the weeds of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt and others before and after him. The following
quote of Ronald tleagan refers not only to those interests,
but pinpoints the area of concern in Latin America, encapsu-
lating almost all of current national interests there:
"...nearness on the mao does not even begin to tell the
strategic importance of Cen-^ral Asarica, borisring as it
does on "^"le Car ibbean- -our lifeline to the ou-^side
world. Two-thirds of all our foraign trade and petroleum
pass throuah the Panama Canal and the Caribbean. In a
a9

European crisis. at least half of our supplies for NATO
would go through thes<? areas by saa... secau'^e of i"-
s
iippor-arce, the Caribbean Basin is a magret for adv«i"cu-
rism. . ." [Ref . 17: p. 6]
In conclusion, O.s. /Latin Aaerican relations aay not
be so easily repaired by the artful reversal of policy that
still manages to uphold the causa Df human righrs, but the
hypothesis is not that realists affect U.S. arms transfer
policy favorably while moralist presidents serve to its
detriment. No policy, program, ilea, or philosophy is an
answer in and of itself. Reagan's stance on arms transfers
is less judgmental, but this one policy does not permeate
all actions with respect to Latin America such that his
departure from moralism on that issue can cure all ills
between us. What is necessary is a mechanism in the
American government through which moralizing and imposing
our standards on other cultures can be reserved to rhetoric.
While nations of the Western way of thinking generally dc
subscribe to aoral ideals, not a siigle one, even those who
realize their weakness and need for protection by industri-
alized and prosperous countries, can accept preaching and
paternalism.
The mechanism may be a decision-making body in the
U.S. government impressing a "mortal danger" and overriding
a moral presidential inclination, or a realist president
rationalizing O.S. self-preservation. Regardless, the U.S.
acts in its national interests based on power realities, and
yet thinks, exprasses, and deeply believes the motivation
for all actions is a question of good vs. evil, right vs.
wrong. The communist ideology being the greatest of all
evils, any "lesser" evils such as terrorism are seen as
encouraged by its mere existence, rather than acknowledged
as a national interest as "vital" as those more directly
related -^o communism. Thus, most a. 3 . national interests in
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Lanir. America-- democratization, fraa trade, poli*--ical and
economic stability, human rights, nuclear non-proliferation,
non-intervention— revolve around and are often su bordir.atsd
to the concept of East versus West. Democracy wears the
white hat, while Communism parades ii the villain's clothes,
manipulating rfealcer governments to a frenzy of instability
so that it can later come to the rescue. While we are mark-
edly improving in our realization of the importance of the
lesser developed players in the world scenario, the U.S. is
still obsessed by the country with the biggest ballets.
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IV- CONDITIONS IN THE RECIPIENT
This chaptar will deal with sconomic aad politico-
inili'^^ary conditions in Latin Ameriri and Brazil, and the
effect of ihess factors on the ariied forces and arming of
those areas.
To reiterate the questions brought up in the
Introduction to the thesis:
What economic interests in Latin Aaerica are of concern to
the U.S.? How did the Latin American/Brazilian economic
situation come about? What can be done to remedy th^ nrob-
leras to benefit the O.S. and Latin Aaerica? can economic
benefits result from arms trade? How does the case country
of Brazil exemplify these benefits?
Wha- is the political situation in Brazil compared to the
rest of Latin America? How do political circumstances influ-
ence arms sales? How do Latin American arms purchases
compare with the rest of the world? What are the implica-
tions of Latin American arms purchase patterns in terms of
regional restraint? What political factors in Brazil ha7e a
bearing on their arms industry and its future?
What is the magnitude of armed forces in Latin America? To
what extent are arms purchased indigenously there? How great
is the capacity to absorb sophisticated arms obtained





1 . Inter? St ra t es
North-South economic intsrl3p?nd'?nc9 , dalicat* ^t
bsst, is a serious national interest of the U.S. The
typical headline topic is concerned with the problem of
American failure to bring down interest rates. Following
are a few manifestations of this probletn: (1) It is
disrupting the world economy, forcing the valaes of ciher
currencies to go down and making i- harder for affected
economies to recover. (2) With Latin American countries
needing loans for development projects, -he industrialized
countries continue extending them and rescedaling paybacks
so that bankruptcy, which would cause the collapse of their
economies, will not be declared. (3) Since the only way
developing countries 3an repay dsbts is to be able to
increase their exports, it introduces complications. \
specific example is the U. S. importing items such as the
Brazil's Bandeirante airplane, and not buying a similar
aircraft domestically [Ref. 18: p. 12].
Other significant Latin American economic problems
center around dependence on world trade and the fall of
direct foreign investment (DFI) . rtisse will be discussed in
turn. But first mention must be made of how the critical
economic situation in Latin America came about.
One explanation for the Brazilian and other Latin
American economies tc have fallen into such a state is
offered by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) , the
Washington-based financial arm of the Organization of the
American States. In its annual report it said that the
economic product for Latin America as a whole fell one
percent last year. In contrast, between the years 196U and
1980, it had never fallen below four percen-^ in any given
year. The IDB gives this as a reason for the Latin American
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countries *o borrow so heavily in anticipation of futur?
growth. [Ref. 19: p. 371] in Brazil, three factors are
responsible for high external indebtedness: (1) the exces-
sive push to industrialize at a high cost; (2) extensive
public sectors; (3) erratic exchange and interest rates
[Ref. 20: p. 354]. The first two are supportive of the TDB's
remark about over- optimistic predictions regarding world
economy.
2. Trade
In the realm of trade, primary products prices ether
than oil are at the lowest levels for thirty years. Latin
America derives over one-third of its expor- revenues from
oil, and as much again from tha sale of other priniary
commodities. Brazil has virtually nD oil, and despite incli-
nations toward greater industrialization, i- still relies
heavily on such primary products as coffee and sugar cane.
Because of rapid population growth, it is particu-
larly vulnerable to a severe downturn in world trade. The
higher the pDpulaticn, the greater demand for eniployment
creation, new infrastructure and services: all expansionary
policies that soak up imports.
3. D irect Investment
Before explaining the meaning of DPI, the following
description of Brazil* s economic development status is
offered in a comparison of Brazil and Mexico on transna-
tional corpcrations and development. The authors of the
study see Brazil as neither "developed" nor "peripheral,"
which is anotier way to refer to "advanced," "developing,"
or "lesser developed" countries. The reasons for its non-
developed classification are: (1) its low gross domestic
product; (2) its highly skewed domestic income; (3) it is a
recipient, net a source of foreign investment; (4) it is a
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debtor, not a creditor; (5) its lack of complexity in
productive struc-are. [Ref. 21: p. 31]
It is classified as non-peripharal b^caise: (1) i*:
is industrialized; (2) it is diversified in i^s aanufactured
exports; (3) it is a strong state with sophisticated admin-
istration to promote and protect local interests. [Ref- 21:
p. 31]
In trying to graduate froa a semiperipheral to a
developed s^ate, Brazil relied on direct foreign investment,
which is the acquisition or control of productive facilities
outside the country [Ref. 21: p. 32].
Since the seventies, Brazil has b=3n trying to
expand local production of capital goods and diversify
export promotion. The importance of finance capital (loans)
relative to DPI has increased, especially in light of the
wish to move up from the semiperiphery. Coanercisl banks
relying on government guarantees are taking over from DFX
capital. investment, hence increasing the burden of
external indebtedness. Although it is not the first time
Latin America was in such a predicaaen-, this time cutbacks
in domestic economies may have to bs quite drastic in order
to remedy the situation.
**• Possible Solutions
Measures dependent on ths world economy such as
increased aid, raising of commodity pricas, eliminating
import barriers, providing International Monetary Fund (IMF)
loans more easily, and lowering laterest ra^res are quite
unpredictable. Thus, other factors such as dsvaluaticn of
currency are undertaken, leading to internal discontent
about resulting inflation and austsrity measures. Such is
the case in Brazil, in whose large cities formar businessmen
are "dayl ighting" as peddlers, and supermarkets are scenes
of rioting and looting.
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A Icolc a.t new d rv^lopments in trad? pa^t^rr-s i'^.di-
cat<5s a brightsr outlook, MhilB primary products -till
coiprise the bulk of axports, thera has been a rise ir. th =
export of sophisticatad maa ufacturas, for exampl*, Brazilian
airplanas and tanks. Othsr trends show a rise in Latin
Amarican intra-ragional trade and diversification towards
new markets. Agencies have been established promoting
transactions within the region, aiiong the^n the Latin
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the Andean Pact,
the Central American Common Market, and the "Latin American
Economic System" (SELA) . On the latter trend, European
Economic Community protectionism thwarts Latin America's
attempts to direct trade away from J. 5. dependence.
It reuains, however, for Latin America -^o overcome
its long-standing trading problens of continued over-
dependence on a few primary products, extreme vulnerability
to fluctuations in O.S. economic policy, and a tendency
towards unsustainable rates of foreign indebtedness.
[R9f. 22: pp. 28-30]
5 • Experts as a Hem ed^
Following is an example 3f what can arms transfers
do for -^he O.S. as supplier in tecas of economic develop-
ment. Note that the data, which treats of Argentina, is not
strictly arms exports related data, but it gives an idea of
what trade with a large Latin American economy can do for
U.S. economic interests.
"The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that:





--eve~Y 1 million lobs creates in taxes (corporate and
individual) ?22 billion in revenue to the U.S. Treasury.
Thus, if the U.S. had obtained only 50 per cent, instead
of 2.86 oer cent of these sales, we would have provided
60,000 to~200,000 additional jobs and some S3. 5 to $U.
4
illion additional revenue to the Treasury.
iS.1 this is for Ar gentina alone.
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C -~ ~ J ^** ^-'*-i. 'T^ m» J. a._^4i not — _j.wiUO« xu XO -Xai- -O- -.I":Congress to quit psnalizing American indust^^v '''''-
workers for the alleged sins of others." [Ref. "12: p.
These noteworthy figures nafee it appear that there
are indeed ecDnoaic benefits to aris trade. Msc, it might
be considered imperative that the U.S. use arms sales -.0
maintain good relations with MexicD and Venezuela for inter-
ests in their petroleum.
a. Critics of Arms Trade
Those who are skeptical of the economic benefits
of arms -iiransfers argue that:
— earnings from weapons exports cover only a small fraction
of U.S. oil import bills, and arms sales consti-^ute only
four to five percent of total U.S. sxports, thereby contrib-
uting relativsly little to i-s balance of paymen'-.s.
— contrary to the quoted example of Argentinar if sale of
arms were significantly curtailed, "no serious unemployment
problems would result."
— few top . S. defense contractors depend on overseas sales
for their ecoaomic survival.
— there is no significant unit cost savings or recoupment of
research and development costs for Pentagon purchases as a
result of most of the military itsms and services sold by
the U.S. to other countries.
— even when Americans deny weapons sales, nations do not
always resort to other suppliers. * Ref . 3: p- 59]
^After this oitch to Congress was made, embargoes not
only to Argentina were lifted or being considered.
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Brazil, one of the couatries that has emerg=sd as
an important regional actor as a rssult of *hs "ercsicn of
ths bipolar systqi" [Ref. 24: p. 132], is a good example of
Latin American commercial arras relations being mor? imncr-
tant than ths political ones. Phis commercial attitude
differs from both the policies of the a.S. and the Soviet
Union, "for which monetary considerations are usually secon-
dary to their political and strategic interests."
b. Brazilian Arms Exporting
In Brazil, as elsewhera, exports seem to be a
key to debt problems. Arms sales ara not only a reliable
source of considerable foreign exchange and hard currency,
but for barker as well. Although the government has been
decreasing its spending, production zf military equipment is
not expected to be affected, sine* hardware exports ar<= a
growing source of foreign exchange, Brazilian weapons and
its sales policy appeal to Third '^orld buyers; they're
simple, inexpensive, and the purcaasers are free to resell
them at any time [ Hef . 25: ?.9]. "Although a mili-^ary-
backed regime with distinctly right-wingad persuasions, the
Brazilian government will do business with anybody, whatever
their political hie, and one plank of foreign policy is -^.ha-^-
the current obsession with East-;Je3t rivalry is not for
Brazil, particularly because it is bad for business,"
[Ref. 26: p. 26] "Brazil is in tie fortunate position of
having no open enemies or frontier problems with its neigh-
bors, which facilitates its open-door arms sale policy." In
the words of the Brazilian minister of aviation: "the
Brazilian arms industry produces to sell. If a customer
appears from Soviet Russia, Japan, or China who wan-^s to
buy, we will sell." [Ref. 34: p. 15]
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Brazil has a ioubla objective in sxpar.iing and
diversifying its arns industry: (1) it wants to prcincte
self sufficiency in arms and technology so as to st:rength9n
tha na-ion's se-rurity and to radacs its dependence on
foreign sourcss of supply, (2) It warts to increase th^
sales of armaments abroad as a stimulus to national and
development of tachnology, and to benefit th=3 country's
economy through auch-needad foreign axchange earnings and
ths training and employment of skilled labor. [ Ref . 27: p.
15]
B. POLITICAL
The political discussions of arms transfers in Latin
Amarica can bs divided into politico-military factors in all
of Latin America, and Brazilian poiitios, military, geopoli-
tical, and future.
1 • Pol iti co-mil ita ry
The oolitics of Latin Aaarica is difficult to
discuss without interrelating then with arms and the mili-
tary. These relationships will be expanded upon by providing
some background on incentives to parchase or to manufacture
arms, the status of arms spending in Latin America as
compared to the rest of the world, and the possibilities for
Latin America to be the first area to exercise regional arms
restraint.
2- Incentives toward Arms Puroiase
A trend toward increased purchase of advanced arms
by the developing world set in during the 70' s. Ths monetary
amount tripled in constant dollars between 1969 and 1978.
Raw data on o/erall military expenditures from 1971 to 1980
using a sampling of eleven Latin Aaarican countries, larg?
and small, proves this at a glance.
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Historic origins of the tcsad are found in the
brsakup of cDlonial smpirss, Andrsw Pierrs explains. In
ordar to show sovereignty, national military establishments
under command of the head of state were created. Arms
served as a symbol of strength and status; providing arms
was a way to gain the loyalty of tie armed forces to polit-
ical leadership. In turn, the military system was a route to
political power. [Ref. 21: pp. 131-132]
Encapsula-ing reasons for tie trends toward beconiing
mere heavily armed, almost all of these apply somewhere in
Latin America: The perception of national security require-
ments based ipon real conflict or perceived threat; the
dominance of the armed forces; the availability of mon<=y in
some oil-rich nations (Venezuela, Mexico) with which to
purchase weapons; the interest of outside powers in arming
their allies to wage war by proxy (Cuba, Nicaragua) ; the
general diffusion of power. [Ref. 2*: p. 132]
3. Arms S^endin^ in Latd.n America
Insofar as how th= region of Latin America compares
to the rest of the developing world in terms of U.S.
interest in transferring arms, the amount of increase in
arms to Latin America is small in conparison with the Middle
East [Bef. 2U: p. 134], which increased twen*y-fold nex-^ to
Latin America's three-fold between 1969 and 1978. While
even that tripling is a respectable augmentation, it may
hint at certain rationales of the [J. S. as a maior supplier
in those fiauces: these 3.S. concerns override its inter-
ests in Latin America: (1) national interests in oil
resources in the middle east; (2) CJ.S. pro-Israel inclina-
tion due to its Jewish population; (3) the greater proximity
of the middle east region to the Soviet anion. Even though
Mexico and Veiezuela are rich in oil, it appears more impor-
tant to the U.S. to maintain friendship, influence, and
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Is'/erage with ths strategically pla^ai, rssoarca-rich Middle
East regions than the Latin American ones. lo Ccmparecl to
the rest of the world, the following figures show La*:in
America's status: [ Ref . 28]
Latin American Arms Sxoanditures
WORLD TOTAL (in millions) $29,400
DEVELOPING WORLD ^52 2,4 00
OPEC $8,900

















loit must, however. be acknowledged that the issue of
ter attention to the liddle rist is becciina eld news,
id^it icnally , deoendence on its oil is not that much heavier
than in ether oil-rich araas. Thr cumulativa figures in
this case do lot tell the story of the sales of fiahter
planes to Venezuela, or of oil riahts in Mexico. Nor do'thev
express any of the much-70calized concern over a myriad of
hisoanic-relatsd issues, among wnich are tha policina of
illegal immiaration, and bilingualism . Domestically, a long




Latin American coantries hav^ dealt wi-h a grea^
diversity of suppliers in the wake Df J.S. imoosed difficul-
ties or l£c< of interest in aris transfers with Latin
America. A reason for declined interest may be that U.S.
hegemony in the Western Hemisphere is not as important as it
was in the years before World War II. Such a statement
implies O.S, control in the situatiDn, and appears as though
no care has been taken to discern that other nations deci-
sions on their defense budgets can De made with many nations
of the world in mind, outside of the United States.
U. Possibilities for Re^ion^l ^i^traint
Remembering that the Latii American region is the
one area in the world that has approached consensus on
restraints, Latin America simply doesn't spend a great deal
on importing arms. Between 1969 and 1973, Latin America
bought only S% of arms imported by developing countries.
Most countries spend less that 2% of their Sross National
Product on weapons, with the exception of Peru, Chile, and
Cuba. Both the Declaration of Ayacucho and the Treaty of
Tlatelolco, described in preceding and followina chapters,
lend credence to the possibility that Latin America may be
the world's first region to agree on arms limitations.
5 • Bra z il ia n Politics
Brazil has a population of over 120 million. Their
leadership in Brasilia is dependent on the cooperation of
business and technocratic elite ii Sao Paulo and Rio in
running the country. Defense and aspects of foreign policy
remain under control of the military. The armed forces
leaders are very nationalistic, and have aspirations of
Brazil becoming a great power. rtiey are independent in
foreign policy, and especially more distant from the U.S.
since the Carter Administration.
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The political system is unlargDing a transi-^ion fron
military to civilian domination and there is much anticipa-
tion as to public behavior when th? process is final. "The
military, which is to end its rule soon, has kep- a -ight
lid on expressions of social dissant since taking power in
1964. But with new opposition party Governors in 10
Brazilian s-ata houses, *•. h is si-^uation could change. 'They
have tc show they're different, they can't rapress in -^he
sam= way,"' said a well-known leftist sociologist [Ref. 29:
344]. Apparsntly ^ his Isftis- acaisniic feels that it is in
the Brazilian sociological makeup to take to the streets, a
practice that has been suppressed since the military -^.ook
ever after ths last great political outpourings in 1964. it
is well to discuss the nineteen years of conditions between
civilian administrations.
a. Brazilian Geopolitical Factors
Societies in Latin Aaarica are so fragmented
that the military arisa as the ruling class out of lack of
national consensus. The Brazilian ailitary elite feel they
have a civilizing mission to perform in their rule of the
country, as do many leaders in Latin America. Since
Brazil's ccup in 1964, the generals in power undertook to
modernize, promote free enterprise, instill efficient tax
systems, and reinforce the state's sconomic authority.
Sjch measures characterize a l2ss militant
concept of rale than ths stereotype of the hawkish Latin
American general. The leaders have "internalized civilian
feelings. They generally don't i.it = rfere except tc restore
conditions for the free exercise of democracy when hampered




Influenced by geopolitics, the objectives of -^he
professional military at that tiiie were to develop th^
interior, provide security for ths South Atlantic, and
dsionstrate leadership in the Third World [Ref. 24: p. 237],
The Johnson Administration, then in power in the
U.S., was in favor of Brazilian foreign policy goals, which
were "to defend the security of the continent against
aggression and subversion whether internal or external."
[Ref. 31: p, 56] In 1965, the regime set up an economic
stabilization program also very much favored by the United
States. It undertook to curtail govarnmant spending,
increase tax revenue, tighten credit, and squeeze wages. The
political system was altered. The constitution was
rewritten, the decision-making powers of the president were
strengthened, thirteen previously existing political pazrties
were narrowed down to two, and the Suprems Court was
enlarged. [Ref. 31: p. 54]
Daring that year, the new mili'rary government
Set up the Industria de Materia Belico do Brasil, or IMBEL,
whose objec-^ive it was to make Brazil as self-sufficient as
possible in arms. In keeping with this philosophy, the
armed forces employ second echelon. Brazilian-nade equipment
over advanced weapons from abroad.
b. Future of Brazilian Politics
In 1935, the first presidential election in
years will probably be done by tha Electoral College, even
though Brazilian public opinion favors open selection.
Since "the process of choosing a President in Brazil has
always set off disputes," [Ref. 32: p. 335] the even^ may
set the stage for mere of the sane. In such nations as
Brazil where civilian leaders may negotiate arms enhance-
ment, the public in support of arms as symbols of prestige




c. laplications for U.S. Rslations
Ttie preceding provided perspective on economic,
political, and military national iaterests ir. arns dealings
concerning Brazil. Despite the appearances of strained
relations with the United States, the Brazilians have not
been entirely non-supportive of sach U.S. national inter-
ests as democratization and human rights. In fact, with
current Brazilian President Figuereido's policv of aber^ura
or opening, many measures have bsen taken to ease civil
pressures in the realm of violent punishment as well as -^o
yield more freedom to average citizens. Tiqht controls on
political activity have been relaxed, and opponents of th«
regime have been allowed to return from abroad [Ref- 33: p.
77]. When the Brazilian government cut off military rela-
tions with the U.S., it was nore coincidental than
intentional that it happened at a time when their wish to
manifest independence and U.S. paternalism peaked. The
Reagan Administration has been reversing the stance on arms
sales, although this will probably not interest the self-
determining Brazilians to reconsider governmant arms deals.
Relations through the small U.S. attache mission there now,
coupled with commercial affiliations in the Brazilian arns
industry seem to strike the medium of Brazilian independence
from the U.S. government while the United States can be
assured of playing a part in their manufacture through
dependence on some American componeits.
C. IRHED FORCES, THE ARMS INDUSTRY, AMD INCENTIVES FOR USE
Having discussed politics and the military, it is neces-
sary to give more mention of the arms industries in Latin
America, as well as the capacity of non-arms producing coun-
tries to absorb sophisticated imported weapons technology.
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In all of Latin America, only Argentina and Brazil have
significant arms industries, Botti assembl* and produce
subsonic aircraft and various weapons, some under lic9ns<=?,
some in cooperation with other countries, such as France or
Italy.
''
• Relative Size of Forces within Latin America
Brazil and Argentina also happen to have the largest
military forces in Latin Ai erica, while other count-^ies have
more per thousand people. Brazil and Venezuela wer"? in
keeping with the Latin American average of four military per
thousand between the years 1971 through 1980. Argentina and
Peru had a higher number, averaging six per thousand. Chile
was the highest with ten on the average, whereas Mexico,
Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala had two military in a
thousand, and Honduras had three. The most interesting
figures were for Nicaragua, whose troops went up from an
average of three for seven years up to ten in 19^9, and -^hen
to twenty in 1980.
Focusing on Brazil, this commentary is informative:
"According ^o London's Institute of Strategic Studies, the
Brazilian armed forces are efficient and modern, with 85
percent of their equipmen*- of national fabrication. With the
Army numbering 188,000 men and nearly 400,003 reservists,
the Navy U7,000, and the Air Force U3,000, Brazil consti-
tutes the strongest military force in Latin America,"
[Ref. 27: p. 15]
2 . Absorpt ive Capacity
With regard to the question of absorptivity, Brazil
has a high capacity; whereas in the rest of Latin America,
no blanket statement can be made. Differences in basic
economic, technological, educational, and military infras-
tructure must all be taken into account. The significance of
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the questiop. is obviansd when it is considsrsl -ha"
throughout Latin America, sophi£ti::at9d equipment has beer.
mod'^stly if not fully utilized to serve a useful and
symbolic purpose [Ref. 1: p. US].
3 • Incent j.ve3 for Use
To have full comprehension of purposes for which
arms might be used, one must be familiar with the possible
threats and challenges to natiDaal security in Latin
America. Amon^ them are border conflicts and in^-urgency.
a. Border Conflicts, Boundary Dispu*eF, and
External Threats
Ssveral pairs of Latin American countries have
bean carrying on feuds for as loig as a hundred years or
more. Considering the length of such unrest, it appears that
the disputes are not of the magnitude to result in full-
scale war. Rather they seem to continue for a number of
reasons, not the least of which is that most Latin
Americans do not forget an injury to their pride. Other
explanations for these n=arly perpetual conflicts include
the potential to divert attention away from domestic prob-
lems, and a paradox that breaks up fraternity, transforming
it into sibling rivalry. The lattsr may be related *'o an
aspect in m ach ismo elevating the status of fighting to that
of a respected art.
The countries engaged ii guarrelr; are Argentina
and Chile, who are at arms about a "parting of the waters"
issue in the Beagle Channel which would determine the owner-
ship of the Lsnnox, Nueva, and Picton Islands th=re, as well
as an Atlantic inlet for Chils. Peru and Ecuador are
fighting over a badly demarcated twanty thousand square mile
area known as "the Amazonian triangle." Ecuador and
Honduras, and the latter with Nicaragua, are also axperi-
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encing territorial conflicts. rh9S9 rivalries will b*
discussed in context with arms rarss.
Brazil's most immsdiata sxtsrnal threat comes
from the Rio de la Plata region ia rhe south where it has
bean in disagreerasnt with Paraguay and Argentina over water
rights.
b. Insurgency
Ideal conditions for insurgency involve an
appropriate combination of civilization and wilderness.
Those areas "nearer to concentrations of popula-^ion,
forested mountains have the greatest potential." [Bef. 35:
p. 60]. They provide the best covsr, are the least open to
traffic, are relatively safe from aircraft operations.
According to this description, the Largest part of Brazil is
exempt from the problem, for its patterns of settlement ar?
so arranged that surrounding areas have only a moderate
potential for insurgency. Any Csntral or South American
countries with highland forests naar suffici=nt popula-^ior.
can shelter insurgents. Thus, ths smaller countries and
islands are prime; Argentina has low potential, and so do
Uruguay and Paraguay. This is not to say thai any country
not fitting the description for lilcelihood of insurgency
will never spawn small belligerent forces.
c. Arms Buildups after Old Conflicts
Arms might also be procured for the prestige of
being ahead in arms supplies. A semblance of an arms race
in Latin America is concentrated in what is known as the
Southern Cone of South America. There are two factors
contributing to such competition in that location. One is
the conflict over the Beagle Channel between Chile and
Argentina, and the other is the Argentines' belligerence
against Great Britain concerning the Malvinas. The
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Chilean-Argentine dispute over the ownership of the islands
of Picton, Lsnnox, and Naeva, naar Tierra del Fuego, and
jurisdiction over the maritiie zoia surrouniinq them has
caused the two countries to significantly build up the mili-
tary along -^heir borders. [Ref. 33: p. 338] rhe result is
Chile striving for parity with its neighbor who is stepping
up and modernizing arms purchases in the aftermath of its
colonial war.
Peru and Chile continus to build up arras as a
legacy of a war fought a century ago in which Peru lost its
southern territories, Ecuador, f=aring that Peruvian arras
could be used to seize its oil fields, has also been drawn
into the race [Ref. 3: p. 53]. In the rest of Latin
America, military hardware sought due to aoguisitions by
neighbors do not contribute to unnsoBssary arms inventories.
Adjacent countries likely to engags in "copy-cat" purchases
are Venezuela-Colombia, and Guatemala-Nicaragua. [Ref. 1:
p. ai]
D. COHMENTAHI
Considering the economic, political, and military condi-
tions as stated, it would be in botfi the short and long terir.
rational interests of the (Jnited states to enable Brazil to
improve its economy through minimal U.S. antagonism of the
Brazilian arms industry. This would be a role to be played
by military attaches, who are ths vestiges of a formerly




V. CONDITIONS IN U.S. CDNDaCIVE TO &RHS DEALS WITH RECIPIENT
A. INTRODOCTION
"Much of tha cri-^icism of *h? Onited Statss policy in
thQ military field shows a lack of understanding of the
principle that political objectives determine military poli-
cies. .. designed. .. to gain Latin Amarica's friendship, to win
its cooperatiDn and support in the O.N. and the O.A.S. .."
[Ref. 37: p. 2 26] "...neither the official U.S. xili-ary
objectives nor the means of attaining them make sense in
terms of the real conditions in Litin America. . .objectives
of O.S. military are primarily political. .. the 1947 Pic
Treaty had baen justified by the concept of collective
security and by rhe assumption of tha threat of aggr'^ssion.
"
[Ref. 37: p. 218]
"The Nixon Doctrine. .. marked the beginning of an
American retrenchment and a decision to raly...cn more indi-
rect ways of upholding U.S. sacurity interests. In
particular, arms transfers came to ba increasingly used as a
substitute for a high military presence in a region."
[Ref. 4: p. 2'4 ]
Such philosophies may well have applied to U.S. dealings
with Latin Aierica during those times. It is no news,
however, for a supplier country to let arms transfer agree-
man-s serve the purpose of supporting national security
interests. Using the fraaework of rationales put forth by
Kemp and Miller in their article "the Arms Transfer
Phenomenon," those reasons applicable to tha United States
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in its significant aras dealings with Latin imericar coun-
tries will be namea.
The authors divided supplier rationales into the catego-
ries of costs and benefits. Both costs and benefits were
broken down into their political, military, and economic
aspects. Military benefits, however, were specified as
direct and indirect. Costs included sociological ramifica-
tions, and only direct military effects. All three aspects
in the "benefit" category will be discussed. Costs will be
treated only in terms of the political (which in Latin




• Politi cal Be nefits
The three main political benefits are thos® of
symbolism and friendship, influence, and leverage. As a
Rand study on the subject area aptly s-a'-.ed:
"Arms transfers are diolomacy by other means. Having
arms, especially prestigious arms, appears to be essen-
tial for the successful conduct of traditional
diplomacy. Indeed, arms have oftan been more important
for their diplomatic symbolism than for their military
capabilities. "
"...^he lessening of United States influence in Latin
America and the expansion of intra-regional relations
probably mean that military diploaacy, based in part on
the acquisition of prestiaious weapons, will b« increas-
inaly significant m the' conduct of intra-hemispheric
relations and in the resolution of potential conflicts."
[Ref. 38: p. 39]
Another method of gaining influence which includes
arms transfers is through security assistance programs. In
what is better defined as mere presence and access in many
instances, 0.3. policy makers and bareaucrats are blinded by
delusions of possibilities to control and understand the
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effects cf American presence in tha recipient. Pecen*".
history in Nicaragua proves there is no way the U.S. can
monitor the political consequences of our security assis-
tance, especially arms transfers. * Ref . 1: p. 44]
Denial, rather than transfac of arms, ha'^. been used
under the Carter Administration to provide some external
leverage for inhibiting repressive practices in some coun-
tries. In other Administrations, Dn the other hand, it has
been mentioned that U.S. arms have taiten the place cf human
representation [Rsf. 1: p. 42].
2 • Military Ben efits
Direct military benefits can be: support for mili-
tary allies; support for friends; arms for base rights; arms
in exchange for intelligence-gathering rights.
a. Sap port for Military Allies
The war over the Fallclands/Malvinas islands
proved to be a difficult situation for the United States.
The fact that the U.S. declared support of and gave much
practical help to the British in intelligence and logistics
certainly did not enhance any ra^orochement or hemispheric
solidarity with Argentina. Nc transfers from the U.S. were
made to either side during the confliot. Past provision of
ships and other military equipment to our Rio Pact ally had
long since been forgotten; that anoient hardware probably
stood out as a reminder of the U.S. making it economically
and otherwise infeasible for even comparatively well-off
Argentina to buy sophisticated weapons.
b. Support for Base Rights
The question of possibly arms, (and probably
more correctly stated military assistance) for base rights




Caribbean locations, particularly Panama. In order of
prsponderance, the United states his Army, Navy, and Air
Force bases ii the Caribbean, Puerto Rico, and the Canal
Zone. The U.S. Navy also has bases at Gaantanamo Bay, Cuba,
and Chaguarauos, Trinidad. The United States Southern
Command is headquartered at Quarry Heights in th* Panama
Canal Zone, aad is responsible for administrative, training,
and operational activities in support of security assistance
efforts throughout Latin America. ; Bef . 35: p. 3 ]
c. Indirect Military Benefits
The indirect military benefits are conventional
arms transfers as a non-proliferation strategy, and use for
testing combat equipment. Only the first of these will be
addressed.
Through the Declaration of Ayacucho in 1974, the
Latin American countries of Argeitina, Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, aid Venezuela pledged -^.hat
they would limit the acquisition of arms for offensive
purposes. This declaration demonstratsd that "...there has
been more interest in Latin America than in any other area
in developing regional restraints on armaments..."
[Ref, 24: p. 233]
The Declaration of Ayaoacho was cited earlier,
bringing out its economic content. Its impor-^.ance is not to
be underestimated, but by the saD5 token, the statements
contained in it do not amoant to mach more than gook inten-
tions and a "state of the unions" proclamation.
The issue of non-proliferation, especially in a
nuclear vein, has aroused concern Dver Brazil. Although it
ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, ten years later it was
slow to enter into force due to certain preconditions among
them the signature and ratificatioa of the second Protocol
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tc the treaty by all powers possessing nuclear weapons
[Raf. 39: p. 9], The U.S. did so ii 1971 [Ref. 39: p. 20],
and in the year of the Senate hearing from which this infor-
mation was drown, the USSR had signed protocol II and was
expected to ratify it.
The Treaty of Tlatelolco prohibits nuclear
weapons in Latin America. The idea of a nuclear-weapons-free
zone originated in a proposal by Brazil in November 1962,
and a joint declaration of the presidents cf Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico in April 1963. Mexico
toolc the lead in negotiating the Isgal framework, and it was
finally signed in a suburb of Mexico City on February 14,
1967 by twenty- two countries.
The significance of the Treaty with respect to
Brazil is that it was one of six countries not a party to
the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) of 1978. Having ratified
the Treaty cf Tlatelolco is regarded as an alternative way
for non-NPT signatory states in Latin America to achieve the
objectives of the NPT. [Raf. 39: p. 9]
Brazil's refusal to siga the NPT had to do wi*:h
acceptance of International Atomic Snergy Ag5ncy (IAEA)
safeguards to verify that peaceful nuclear activities were
not directed to the end of creating nuclear weapons
[Bef. 39: p. 20]-
Two possible reasons for Brazil's behavior
fellow: (1) Brazil is feeling th5 animosity encouraged by
Carter's administration. (2) Having originated the idea of
a Latin American nuclear-free-zone years before, it antici-
pated its declaration of non-prolif sration in the Treaty of
Tlatelolco once the preconditions ware met.
The reason nuclear power is of special concern
in Brazil is that in the mid-seventias it had entered into
an agreement with West Sermany through which it would be
provided all "equipment, fuel, and technology needed to
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develop nuclear weapons." [Ref. HO: p. 123] Net having
signed the NFT, and posssssing extensive uraniam deposits,
there is nothing the IAEA could do to prevent Brazil from
becoming a nuclear weapons power [Bef. 40: p. 124].
Brazil, having conceived of the idea of a
nuclear-weapons- free zone, appears to be forthright in its
claim that its nuclear capability will not be assd for other
than peaceful purposes. To summarizs, in Brazil's case, the
transfer of conventional weapons does not derive "rhe mili-
tary benefit mentioned above. Nevertheless, the improving
political relations between tha a.S. and Brazil and the
satisfactory commercial linkages to their arms industry do
contribute to preserving Brazil's intentions for non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons.
3 * Econoi ic Ben efits
Economic benefits to be incurred from arms transfers
are five: (1) arms sales contribute to a favorable balance
of payments; (2) arms sales help ralieve unemployment; (3)
they reduce unit costs; (4) there ar= linkages between mili-
tary and commercial sales; (5) arms may b? transferred in
exchange for resources.
a. Improvement of Balance of Payments
The effect of arms transfers from the U.S. to
Latin America on d.S. balance of payments is negligible,
considering how long it has been since any activity in arms
transfer deals, what was transferred, (old World War II
surplus) and the fact that U.S. prices have been prohib-
itively high, and our credit terms more stringent. This
added to the considerations raised in the previous chapter
suggest that Latin American arms transfers do not int<=rest
the U.S. in sconomic terms. That is, the transfer of U.
S
arms to Latin America is not of as nuch interest as the rise
of arms production in Argentina and in particular, Brazil.
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b. Rslief from Unemployment
Arms sales to Latin Amsrica would r=^lieve unem-
ployment, but it is rationalized that if they were cut from
the status auo, no more serious unenploympnt problems would
re s u 1 1
.
^' Reduction of Snil Costs and Encouragemen-^ of
Commercial Linkages
The benefit of reducing unit costs is contingent
upon more activity than is prevaleat between the O.S. and
Latin America. Linkage between commercial and military
sales is subject to the same commentary. However, in Brazil,
and interesting pattern appears in the Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) r Military Assistance Program (MAP), and commer-
cial expenditires shown in figure (1). Overall, until 1979,
FMS, which involve government-to government transactions,
followed a similar pattern with commercial sales.
Conversely, between 1967 and 1968, and 1970 and 1972, FMS
rose and commercial sales declined, Between 1974 and 1975,
when FMS were taking a tremendous leap, commercial sales
were almost level. In 1976, the FMS and commercial sales
were at their highest, and nearly equal, at $ua million.
Bothe dove in 1977, declined somewhat until 1978, at which
time FMS began a steady decline, opposed to commercial
ssales which continue to go up.
The significance zf these findings is both economic
and political. In the economic sense, they appear to prove
the theory between military and commercial sales.
Politically, the trends nay be explained by presidential
policy. Prior to the Carter administration, FMS were always
higher than the commercial. Subsequent to that, after a




A similar study was done jsing Canada as th<r cas^
country, chosen because of its relative fre«*dom from human
rights violations. in figure (2) , i*: can be seen -hat there
was no marked rise and fall around 1976 as there was in
Brazil.
a. Arms for Resources
The agreement to sell F-16s to Venezuela is one
instance of establishing a possible arms for resources rela-
tionship. Although some economic benefit is a
consideration, no single economic or national security
benefit is -^.he motiva-^-ion. The United States certainly has
an interest in Venezuelan oil. The agreement to sell
fighter planes *:o Venezuela bears that advantage and also
that of good a.S. security relations with Venezuela as a
presence in the Caribbean Basin area. Venezuela considers
itself the gateway to South America, and is highly concerned
with its crucial, strategic position.
C. COSTS
As is often the case for many issues in Latin
America, political and military cos-cs are intertwined.
Direct and indirect political costs are: (1) reverse
leverage; (2) cost of supplier's attempts to exert leverage;
(3) indirect political cost— promotion of regional arms
races
a. Reverse Leverage
Reverse leverage occurs when a so-called
"weaker" (recipient) country gains an advantage through arms
transfer or other relations and is in a posi-ion to manipu-
late the "stronger" one. In order to avoid such an
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occurrence, a Rand Corporation publication of 1977 on arms
transfer in Latin America mentioned two alternatives in arms
transfer policy for the U.S.: prs-emptive dsalinas and
considering the politico-military benefits of Latin America
diversifying its arms suppliers. ;Ref. 38: p. 5U"]
(1) Pre-emp tion: The first alternative recom-
mends discouraging purchase of aris from o^her than ths
United States, not necessarily encouraging but not
restricting U.S. arms sales to Latin America. Such an
approach arises as a lesson learned from deteriorated mili-
tary relations between the U.S. and the Latin American
countries, and of course, most especially, Brazil.
Antagonism not only stimulates the rise of political nation-
alism, but foments resentment of U.S. paternalism and
indifference. [Ref. 38: p. 53]
Minimizing of third party sales is aimed at
limiting a rival's potential influence. Those sales to a
third country considered to be detrimental to the United
Sta-es are -hDse which (1) jeopardize U.S. military advan-
tages and training relations; (2) lessen leverage that could
have been gained through logistic and resupply functions;
(3) are costly to the recipient and divert greater economic
resources than would U.S. sales; (4) may disrupt access and
relations with individual countries. [Ref. 38: p. 54]
(2) Reg iona l arms diversification: The advan-
tage of encouraging regional arms diversification is that it
enables the use of arms transfer policy to bargain with
another supplier and benefit by allowing that supplier to
consummate the deal. Another positive factor in supplier
diversity is that it can help guard against the too-intense
involvement that leads to reverse leverage.
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Eaverse leverage was avoidad during the pracnic?
of the Good N9ighbor Policy of the 1930s. Specifically, at
that time •'hare were small scala wars in Latin America,
declining U.S. influence and intervention in regional
affairs, and increasing diversification of local military
relations with European coun-ries. U.S. non-intervention
and allowance for diversification was the best policy for
keeping leverage in a favorable direction to the U.S.
[Ref. 38: pp. 54-55]
b. Cost Df Supplier*s A-^tempts to Ex«rt Leverage
In Latin America, th* U.S. at-empts to exer^r
leverage both by the transfer and denial of arms. The
adverse effect of the human rights policy as a punitive
exercise of arms denial is a salient example that both can
be ineffective. In fact, events pcovsd the mirror image of
the philosophy expressed in the following comment taken from
the Rand study:
"In some cases the U.S. governasn- may treat an incre-
mental arms transfer as' an inves-men- for future
influence, but the rscipient nay treat this same
transfer as a payoff or reward for some cooperative
action already taken." [Ref. 38: p. 53]
Other costs are the already mentionad dangers of
reverse leverage and the promotion of arms races. while no
specific examples of the former exist at present, likely
recipients who may one day maneuver into a manipula-^ ive
position are lexico and Venezuela. The latter question will
not be addressed again here.
c. Sociological
The sociologioal costs are that arms sales can
identify th« supplier with repressive regimes. The second




Latin American arms transf^^r authority Caesar
Sereser^s sumnarizsd the major coniitions in Latin America
which complicate U.S. arms transfer policies, rhey include
"the lessening a.S. presence in the region, the continuing
effort by Latin America to diversify relations, and the
lilcelihood of conflict rather than cooperation between Latin
American countries, and the repressive and au-^horitar ian
practices of several countries in the region." [Ref. 41: p.
HQ] The last condition, that of repressive and authoritarian
practices of several Latin Americai countries, was studied
in depth by Lars Schoultz of the City University of New
Yor^:. He found that, despite Jnitad States efforts *:o
avoid, in effect, strengthening military regimes that
violate antitorture human rights, both economic and military
aid tended to flow disproportionately to Latin American
countries which -ortured their citizens. [Ref. '*2: p. 167]
The specific countries which recaived 69 percent of the
total military aid to Latin America for FY 1975 through FY
1977 were Argentina, Brazil and Unguay. In the former two
countries, as the 1970's progressei, military aid continued
to amount to nore than half of that extended to the rest of
Latin America. Correlations were higher in the earlier
period because non-repressive governmen-s were receiving
almost no military aid, a situation which began to change
somewhai after 1977.
Arms transfers figure into these findings as a
large percentage of "Total Military Assistance," which is
composed of the Military Assistance Plan (MAP),
International Military Education and Training (IMET) grants,
excess defense stock, transfers, and Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) credits. At the time of the study, 89 percent of the
U.S. military aid to Latin America was in the form of FMS
credits. [Ref. 42: p. 161]
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A3 Dr. Caasar Ser9s<rr53 wrot* in his pr = p=r9'^
statement at a House hearing on arms "ransfers:
"The focus Dn human rights repre32nt9d a reaction to the
failure of iemocracy as the antidote to both dic-a-or-
ship and revolution. As authoritarian regime- anieri!\in3d
the* hcDes for ieinccrac7 in the h9misph'='rr , Drot<=st
against' violations of human rights became a central
issue--with arms transfers singlad ou- as ? tool for
leverage and punishment. One Brazilian newsoaner labeled
the application of the human rights policv "as realism
for the s-^rong and idealism for ti? weaic. " TRef. 1: p.
42]
This fascinating *:wist of terms bears commentary in light of
what was written on idealism and raalism in chapt^-r two. It
appears that in Brazilian perceptiDn, i"^ is rasy for the
strong, (the a.S.) to dictate our ideal of the practice of
human rights, because for us the idial is a reality. In the
weak countries needful of realization of the rights of man,
the application is yet an ideal.
To summarize, U.S. b^nafits to arms deals with
Brazil would oertainly outweigh th9 costs, but only on the
condition that ths U.S. enter into any agreements as a busi-
nsss partner. That is, its should be careful no": to exhibi*
any remaining attitudes of its forma r paternalistic stance.
This is easi«*r said than done, howav = r, especially in light
of the extremes of economic interdependence between ~he two




VI. THE STATOS OF ARHS TRAH5FER IN BRAZIL
This chapter will describe the level of arms ir. Brazil.
After some background, the country will be examined as a
recipient, co-producer, and supplier of arms. Although the
rationales for their purchase have already been discussed,
they will be reiterated. The implications for the U.S. of
the development of the arras industry in Brazil will also be
reviewed.
A. BACKGROOND
Brazil's current status as the tenth supplier of world arms
is not attributable exclusively to the unintended incentive
provided by D. S. denials. The more accurate explanation is
the steps Brazil had already taken toward self-
determination. .
When the Industria ds Materia Belico do Brasil (IMBED
was started ia 1965, the United States governmen-^, had still
been the major supplier of arms in Brazil. The Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) program in the United States was exer-
cising its transfer of arms at the world's most costly rate,
still keeping itself attractive through featuring a wide
range of available equipment, technical support, and
follow-on programs for spare parts. The Mili-^ary Assistance
Program (MAP) was being cut back due to Congressional and
balance of payments pressures. In the 1950' s, the MAP had
provided arms as grants to countries with collective
security agreements with the U.S.
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Brazil had already acquired Aisrican dsstrovers and
cruisers for its Navy, ar.d full track armored personnel
carriers for the Army, among which were the !1-113. U.S.
aircraft incljded training/ground attack , reconnaissance,
and counterinsurgency planes, C-139 transports, bombers, and
fighters.
Today Brazil's purchases are far fewer, lainly because
its economy 3emands that it curtail spending. I* remains
severed from the U.S. relative to arms transfers done
through the government since its unilateral abrogation of
military assistance in reaction to Carter's human rights
policy. However, it does considerable direc busin<=ss with
private U.S. companies. Other reasons for the breaking away
from the U.S. government should be restated: (1) s-lf-
sufficiency as a goal had long been a Brazilian aspira-^ion;
and (2) neither the anticipated threat nor the financial
capabilities of Brazil saw it in the marke*- for sophisti-
cated and expensive equipment, e.g., the F-16, as a country
like Venezuela needed and could affcrd.
B. BRAZIL AS A RECIPIENT
Brazil's biggest arms-related purchases are par's for
the weapons it produces domestically. For military aircraft,
the Empresa Brasileira Aerea (EM3RASR) iraoor-s, on -he
average, sixty percent of its components. Pratt and Whitney,
a U.S. company, provides Brazil with almost all of i^^s
airplane engines, since cost and standardization advantages
outweigh undesirable dependence on a sole supplier. Prance
is a major supplier of H-93 gun turrets for one of Brazil's
armored personnel tanks, in exchange Brazilian electronic
components that go into French Mirage aircraft. It also
acquires Roland missiles from France. The Italians are
suppliers of Oto Meiara howitzers to Brazil. Its most
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racsnt contGmpla-^-ai purchase is of Israel's Gabriel missile
for Navy corvettes.
C. BRAZILIAN CO -PRODOCTIOH
Besides the French co-production arrangement for gun
turrets, Brazil has a license with Aerospatiale to produce
helicopters. Its relations with Italy are extensive,
co-producing the Brazilian-assembled flB-326G Xavante with
Aeritalia in a project with Brazil for a supersonic aircraft
known as the AM-X. [Ref. !I3]. An amphibian vehicle devel-
oped by the Italian Biselli company features a disel engine
which is uncommon in Brazilian army tanks.
Another licensing arrangement is held with (J.S. manufac-
turer Piper, for light passenger aircraft. ENGESA
(Engenheiros Especializados, Sociedade Anonima) or
Specialized Engineers, Incorporated, cooperates with the
U.S. Bell Aerospace Division of Textron in manufacturing a
wheeled amphibious personnel carrier called Hydroccbra for
the U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces.
Licensing and co-prodacticn arrangements cannot detract
from Brazil's position as having the largest, domestic arms
industry in Latin America. From IMBEL's beginnings in the
late 1960's and early 1970* s with the Bandeirante aircraft,
a twin-engine turboprop, it now supplies industrialized and
developing countries alike with weapons including small arras
and guartermaster supplies, military hardware, armored vehi-
cles, patrol boats, support ships, and light transport,
passenger, and training aircraft.
D. DOMESTIC ARHS INDOSTRI
The three main domestic arms eiterprises in Brazil are
the already mentioned EMBRAER and ENGSSA, manufacturers of
aircraft and armored vehicles, respectively, and AVI3HAS
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(Aviacao do Brasil) which is the country's privat ^ly-owne'l
missiles and rockets company.
Customers of Brazilian manufactured arras Cc.n b<? divided
into major suppliers as recipients, other Latin Am-^rican
countries, other Third World, the asSR and the People's
Republic of China (PRC).
1
.
Sup plier -Recipient 3
Major supplier recipients are France and the United
Kingdom, both purchasers of EJlBRASR's Xingu (EJ13-121)
trainer. Although not considered i major supplier, Belgium
as an industrialized country, should be mentioned as a Xingu
recipient.
2 . Other Latin America
In Latin America, Colombia has also purchased the
EH3-121 trainer. Uruguay, Chile, and Honduras have bought
such planes, the latter country recently buying the Tucano
model for basic military training. The Bandeirante (EMP-111)
aircraft is used by Argentina for maritime patrol and search
and rescue (SAR) missions. [Ref. »»].
3. Ulili World
The rest of the Third World is ^f considerable
interest to Brazilians, especially the oil-producing coun-
tries. Besides the usual best-selling Xingu sold widely
throughout the Middle East, Libya has purchased $50 million
wcthh of armored vehicles, and Iraq bought a number of
missiles in 1981
.
After years of disagreement, the armies of Brazil
and Algeria reached a diplomatic rapprochement, consummating
resumed relations with a purchase of $uio million in arms
and armored cars in 1982. Prior to the sale, Algerians had
been using Soviet equipment. [Ref. 15].
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other Third World buyers include ?oao, Gabcr.,
Tunisia, and Qatar, which is now owner of some of the
Brazilian whesled armored vehicles, of which there are three
types: ENGESA»s EE-9 C-iscavel (Portuguese for "rattles-
nake"), the six-wheeled Orutu, and the Jararaca.
U
. Ccm mun ist Co untr ies
The Soviet anion, to whon Brazil is second in the
production of light, rubber tired irjiored vehicles, itself
purchased a thousand of the same.
Among the reasons for sales of armored vehicles to
the PRC are the need for foreign currency and to expand
sales in Asia. Brazilians also rrnarked on -^-he good treat-
meat afforded to their technicians by the Chinese.
(Eef. 46].
E. FOTURE BRAZILIAN PRODOCTIONS
New arms in development are a light secret weapon called
the "Sucuri," probably a cannon. It is a protctyoe of
ENGESA. ENGEX, developing 105 millimeter cannons, has a
subsidiary manufacturing a 90 milliaster version.
Among fifty national industries involved in production
of arms, other than the four mentioned above, are CTA
(Centre Technico Aerospacia 1) , responsible for the automati-
cally controlled "Piranha" missile. CTA is also developing a
land-sea-air rocket produced by Avibras to be used in
country. Other names of import ars D.F. Vasconcelos, maker
of optical equipment for tanks, e-c, and ENVEMO
(Engenheiros ie Vehiculos de Motores) , developers of more




F. IMPLICATIONS OF BRAZIL* S GR0WIH3 ARMS INDUSTRY
The significance of Brazil's arms industry is virtually
nil in comparison with those of any of the indus-rialized
countries. Considering the a ver-surfacing economic
constraints of balance of payments, foreign dsb*^, interest
rates, the strong dollar, and increasing protectionism, i^
would appear that Brazil should be paralyzed in its
purchases. In fact, while the FAB (Forca Aerea Brazileira)
is exemplary of the other armed forces in seeking develop-
ment rather than growth in terms of force, purchases are
still being made.
Most newsworthy arms deals involve the troubled Middle
East. Being almost fully dependent on external source for
the oil it consumes in extremely larga quantities, Libya and
Iraq have enjoyed close relations with Brazil and possess
many sophisticated Brazilian weapons, including light tanks
and missiles, as well as the Tucano trainer. Now it appears
Brazil has chosen Israel's Gabriel missile package to arm
the new generation of naval corvettes to be built in the
next ten year?. The training and manitenance of the missile
was more than the U.S., French, and Italian competitors
offered. What implications this will have for Brazil's
standing with the Arab world remain to be seen. [Ref. 47:
p. 338].
Another sensitive situation involves the fact that
Brazil consistently offers the U.S. its passenger aircraft
at a more attractive price than the U.S. can manufacture a
similar aircraft. This leads to aach protest in the "buy
American" vein. It is doubly ironic when the fact of




Many IsssDns are to bs learr.eJ by Brazil ir. becoming a
self-sufficient nation, especially while it practices its
liberal "sell to anyone, bay from anyone" policy. There are
three instances wherein it will bs interesting to see the
reactions of Brazilian policy makers: the aforementioned
"invited" friction brought about by the deal with Israel and
the subsidy problem involving the Jnited States, and the
sizeable sale of armored personnel carriers ongoing with the
Soviet Union. It is reasonable to conjecture that Brazil
will soon discover weaknesses in the assumption that certain




In th<T boiy of the thesis, it was pointed out that due
to the abstra:::t and debatable natace of the concept of ths
national in-^erssts, one should be careful about assuming
direct effects between interests and actions. Ra-'-her it
should be taken into account that the way a policy is
enacted becomes more meaningful than the philosophy behind
it, because often this philosophy is peculiar to the
executor, and certainly to the nation enacting it. When
countries who are subjected to U.S. policies don't under-
stand our rationales, it is unwise tD lake assumptions about
the "object" (or recipient) country's next moves. More
importantly, it should not be assmei that our rationales
are so complsx, and that lack of comprehension underlies
recipient countries' reactions. "Dsveloping" countries are
not as politically unsophisticated as we might assume. They
are as capable cf independent and reasoned foreign policy
decisions as are fully emsrged powars.
In brief, a study of the affect of U.S. national
interes" on arms transfers in Latia America, concentrating
on Brazil, is a story of Latin Americans wishing to reject
the notion that the U.S. should presume to have any effect
on arms transfers in their countries. Brazil proves to be
having more success in this area, although economic interde-
pendence behooves continued strong ties with the United
States. Sines exports are the key to improving economy, and
aorms are the highest income-producing export, Brazil is
developing its arms industry to that end.
89
i1
The correlation between a Unitei States policy and arms
transfers in Brazil is only superficial. Resentment to colo-
nialism and paternalism had been siamsring long before the
moralistic iatervention of the O.S. human rights policy
brought it to a full boil. Withdrawal of military assistance
had been coitemplated for years on the part of the
Brazilians themselves, not to mention that into the seven-
ties, under Nixon, all Military Assistance Programs were
being cut ba::k. Furthermore, tha fact that there are no
Foreign Military Sales to Brazil excludes that Brazil still
relies heavily on O.S. companies for components of its
domestically assembled weapons. This merely apparent corre-
lation will be treated as a causa and effect relationship
for purposes of these concluding remarks.
The main conclusion is one of a qualified cause and
effect relationship between a U.S. national interest in the
name of the haman rights policy, aid the growth of the arms
industry in Brazil, assuming that it increased all the more
with the lack of dependenca on U.S. arms. In other words,
the O.S. national interests did indirectly have the effect
of motivating Brazil to be the first emerging power in South
America to practice rather than praach self-determination.
The arms indastry is a good measure of such an intention
being fulfilled.
To enumerate the effects, they were: (1) Brazil's
unilateral withdrawal of military assistance; (2) the
buildup of its arms industry with a pronounced tendency to
make each successive production mora Brazilian; (3) expan-
sion of the aarket to the Third World, particularly the
oil-producing countries; ( U) strengthening of co-production
arrangements with major suppliers other than the United
States, namely Italy and France; (5) enhancement of (or no
damage to) direct commercial arms oonponen-s sales relation-
ships with U.S. private companies.
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Conversely, the ill feelings for which hanan ricjhts
takes the blaie did not affect some arms related trans-
actions where Brazil plays the part of supplier to the U.S.
as recipient: (1) the amphibian Hydrocobra for the Fapid
Deployment Forces; and (2) Bandeicante passenger aircraft,
commercially used in the Q.S., is assd militarily as well in
Brazil.
Whether the effects are adverss in the U.S. view is a
matter of philosophy. Those who believe it is in our
national interests to exert more control over Brazil through
arms transfers would say the five points abov? are in fact
detrimental. The same could be said for the use of th9
Brazilian sea-land personnel carrier, and worse for those of
the "buy American" persuasion who are appalled by what
subsidized imports from Brazil are doing to Q.S. economy.
On the other hand, a positive relationship between a
growing arms industry, more income from exports, greater
domestic well-being and subsequent improved climate for
political stability and even democracy can be in'-.erpreted as
quite beneficial to O.S. in-erests. No- only would the
Brazilian initiated l aisse z -fair e with regard to the United
States be noi-detriment al as referred to above, i-^ might
also eventually prove the "mutual respect" we have heralded,
by showing a little more of it on our side. The expansion of
the market in South to South exchanges as well as in deals
with industrialized countries can help the U.S. interests
in two ways: (1) by preventing a too close relationship and
contemptual dependence; and (2) by fostering the maturity of
Brazil as a global actor and emerging power, subjecting it
to the complications of foreign relations that its northern
superpower neighbor has bean dealing with for years. It may







Brazilians acknowledge tha need fou global interdependence.
In dealing with them on a largely commercial basis, the U.S.
can maintain ties while still allowing Brazil to a"*!tempt to
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